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STATE AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: FROM 
EVERSON TO ZELMAN A CRITICAL REVIEW 
Dr. Mark J. Chadsey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons­
Harrii was the latest salvo in a long conflict over state aid to 
religious schools in America, but will not end the battle over 
this controversial issue. Both sides in the argument continue 
to press their position before various branches and levels of 
governmene To fully understand the implications of the 
Zelman decision, it is important to have a sense of case his­
tory in this area. To that end, Part II of this article presents 
a critical review of most of the major cases involving state aid 
to religious schools prior to Zelman. Part III of this article 
briefly examines the social and educational pressures that 
have pushed public opinion and school officials toward in­
creasing acceptance of voucher programs. Part IV offers a fo­
cused discussion of Zelman following which I conclude that 
voucher programs, if properly designed, are constitutional. In 
keeping with the Court's decision, I argue that to find such 
programs constitutional the Court must conclude that the 
state is neutral as between the religious and nonreligious 
school choice. To conclude that the state is acting in a neutral 
* Dr. Chadsey is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political 
Science and International Studies at SUNY College at Brockport. Dr. Chadsey 
earned his Ph.D. at the University at Buffalo in 1996 and his Juris Doctorate at 
Columbia University in 1986. Dr. Chadsey would like to thank his parents, 
Bradford and June, his wife Deborah and his children Meghan and Bradford for 
their sacrifices and loving support which have made his academic career possi­
ble. 
1. 536 u.s. 639 (2002). 
2. See, e.g., Associated Press, House Approves a Voucher Plan for Poor 
Washington Students, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at A12 (reporting that the 
House of Representatives had approved a voucher plan for Washington D.C.). 
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manner, the Court must determine that the state is not coerc­
ing parents to register their children in religious schools. In 
deciding whether parents are coerced, the Court may look at 
the entire range of options available to parents when choosing 
a school for their child, including public schools not formally a 
part of the voucher program as designed by the state. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND THE 
STATE 
A. The Early Cases: Everson, McCollum, and Zorach 
Everson v. Board of Education3 was the first case in 
which the Supreme Court considered whether the state might 
offer any assistance to those who wish to attend sectarian 
schools. In Everson, the question was whether the state of 
New Jersey could authorize local school boards to reimburse 
parents of children attending parochial schools for money 
they spent on bus transportation to and from school. 4 The 
New Jersey taxpayer who objected to the statute argued that 
the statute "forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help support 
and maintain schools which are dedicated to, and which regu­
larly teach, the Catholic Faith."5 
After a brief, and somewhat incomplete,6 review of the 
history surrounding the adoption of the Establishment 
Clause, Justice Black concluded: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Govemment can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid 
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither 
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away 
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief 
or disbelief in any religion .... No tax in any amount, 
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court had earlier taken up the question of 
whether the state can prohibit parents from sending their children to sectarian 
schools in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), but that case in­
volved no state aid to religious schools. 
4. Everson, 330 U.S. at 5. 
5.  Id 
6. Justice Black's analysis led him to conclude that the Establishment 
Clause was intended to provide the same protection against govemmental in­
trusion on religious liberty as the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, originally 
written by Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 12-13. Contra Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 91-99 ( 1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court is mistaken 
in assuming that the Establishment Clause protections and prohibitions mirror 
those found in the Virginia statute). 
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large or small, can be levied to support any religious ac­
tivities or institutions .... Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af­
fairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice 
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against estab­
lishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of 
separation between church and state."7 
701 
Despite this strong language, the Court held that the 
New Jersey statute was constitutional, noting that the state 
of New Jersey was acting in a neutral manner because it was 
authorizing the reimbursement "as part of a general program 
under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and 
other schools."8 According to the Everson Court, neutrality 
was the key to understanding the Establishment Clause as it 
relates to state support of religious education.9 The Court 
noted that the Establishment Clause "requires the state to be 
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and 
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adver­
sary."10 
Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jack­
son, and Burton, dissented and argued for a much more re­
strictive interpretation of the Establishment Clause: 
The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the 
official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, 
outlawing only a formal relation such as had prevailed in 
England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to 
uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader 
than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It 
was to create a complete and permanent separation of the 
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by compre­
hensively forbidding every form of public aid or support r l" . n tor re 1g10n. 
The kind of complete and permanent separation for 
which the dissent argued was, of course, impossible to achieve 
absent a willingness to deny religious institutions the most 
basic services offered by the state. As the majority opinion 
pointed out, the wall of separation had already been breached 
7. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 164 (1878)). 
8. Id. at 17. 
9.  Id. at 18. 
10. ld. 
1 1 .  Id. at 31-32. 
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when the state provided police and fire protection as well as 
sewage treatment and sidewalks to churches.12 Unless the 
Constitution requires that the state stand by and watch 
churches burn to the ground or rabbis be mugged in broad 
daylight, complete separation is not possible. 
Next, the Court was called upon to decide whether chil­
dren could participate in a "release time" program when reli­
gious education classes were taught on public school grounds. 
In Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Board of Education,13 a local 
school board in Illinois agreed to allow religious instruction 
teachers of various faiths to teach in public schools. In order 
for children to participate, their parents had to sign a request 
card granting permission for the student to attend the 
classes. 14 Children whose parents did not want them to take 
such classes were required to continue their regularly sched­
uled classes. 15 
The Court struck the program down on the grounds that 
the program utilized a "tax-established and tax-supported 
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their 
faith." 16 The Court made no effort to devise an Establishment 
Clause "test" beyond endorsing the dissenters' views in Ever­
son by arguing that the "First Amendment has erected a wall 
between church and state which must be kept high and im­
pregnable."17  The Court said that the Establishment Clause 
required that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion."1 8  
Justice Reed, the lone dissenter in McCollum, took issue 
with the idea of interpreting the Establishment Clause as re­
quiring a wall of separation between church and state. Jus­
tice Reed pointed out that Thomas Jefferson, the author of 
that phrase, supported the teaching of religion at the Univer-
12. /d. at 16, 17. 
13. 333 u.s. 203 (1948). 
14. Id. at 207. 
15. Id. at 209. 
16. Id. at 210. 
17. /d. at 212. The Court further indicated its approval of the dissenting 
view in Everson with two footnotes that quoted the dissenters at length. /d. at 
210 nn.6 & 7. 
18. Id. at 210. 
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sity of Virginia, which he founded.19 Justice Reed argued that 
the actions of people like Thomas Jefferson and James Madi­
son were better indicators of their views regarding the First 
Amendment than abstract "figures of speech"20 like "wall of 
separation" between church and state. Justice Reed's dissent 
is particularly salient given that Jefferson penned the ubiqui­
tous phrase in a private letter to the Danbury Baptist Asso­
ciation fourteen years after the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights.21 Logic dictates that official public speeches and ac­
tions of individuals during, or shortly after the period when 
the First Amendment was passed· provide better, albeit im­
perfect, insights into their interpretation of the Establish­
ment Clause than does private correspondence a decade and a 
half later. Mter all, those who might have been inclined to 
rely on Jefferson's lead could hardly be expected to have 
based their decision on statements he made in private corre­
spondence fourteen years afterthey considered the issue. 
In Zora ch v. Cla uson,22 the Court was called upon to de­
cide if New York State could release students, during the 
school day and at their parents' request, to attend religious 
instruction classes. Unlike the local school board in 
McCollum, however, New York State required that the 
classes be taught off public school property. 
In what may appear to be paradoxical language, the 
Court found the "release time" program constitutional, stat­
ing 
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First 
Amendment reflects the philosophy that the Church and 
State should be separated. And so far as interference with 
the "free exercise" of religion and an "establishment " of re­
ligion are concerned, the separation must be complete and 
unequivocal . . . . The First Amendment, however, does 
not say that in every and all respects there shall be a 
separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously de­
fines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall 
be no concern or union or dependency one on the other.23 
The language appeared paradoxical because the Court 
19. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 245-46. 
20. ld. at 247. 
21. ld. at 244 n.8. 
22. 343 u.s. 306 (1952). 
23. ld. at 312. 
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seemed to suggest that the Constitution required a wall of 
separation that was "complete and unequivocal . . .  and abso­
lute," while maintaining that this absolute rule did not apply 
in "every and all respects."24 Properly understood, the appar­
ent contradiction in the Court's opinion disappears. The 
Court was simply suggesting that in cases where the state 
was actually attempting to establish a church or interfere 
with anyone's free exercise rights, the wall of separation was 
absolute. In cases like Zorach, however, where no one could 
reasonably argue that the state's intention was to actually 
"establish" a religion, the Constitution allowed states leeway. 
Provided that the state abides by the rule that "[t]he govern­
ment must be neutral when it comes to competition between 
sects,"25 the states had room to accommodate the religious de­
sires of their citizens. 
The approach taken in Zorach was, as the Court sug­
gested, in keeping with "the common sense of the matter."2 6 If 
the state's action suggested an intention to actually "estab­
lish" a church, favor one church over another, or interfere 
with anyone's freedom of conscience, the Constitution would 
require an impregnable wall of separation. As the state's ac­
tion moved further and further away from "establishment" or 
"interference," the Court would interpret the Constitution as 
permitting greater interplay between church and state. The 
neutrality approach insisted upon by the Court allowed those 
parents who wanted formal religious training to be a part of 
their children's schooling to obtain such education. 2 7  Simi­
larly, it allowed those parents who did not want their children 
exposed to religious views of any kind to shield their offspring 
from religious education.28 
The Court next took on the issue of school prayer in 
Engel v. Vitale.29 In Engel, parents of ten students sued New 
York for allowing children to recite the following voluntary 
nondenominational prayer in its public schools: "Almighty 
God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg 
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our 
24. Id 
25. Id. at 314. 
26. Id at 312. 
27. Id. at 314. 
28. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314. 
29. 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
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Country."30 
The Court held that New York had violated the Constitu­
tion by allowing its Board of Regents to compose the prayer 
and by further allowing students to recite it in public 
schools.31 Once again, the Court made no attempt to offer any 
Establishment Clause "test" for use in such cases. The Court 
did argue that the neutrality requirement established in 
Everson and Zorach would not be sufficient to save public 
school prayer: "Neither the fact that the prayer may be de­
nominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the 
part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the 
limitations of the Establishment Clause."32 
In Zorach, the Court had established the principle that 
the closer the state's action came to "establishing'' an official 
religion, the greater the degree of scrutiny the Constitution 
required. Engel extended this principle by noting that a more 
demanding standard of review would apply to action that 
"does not amount to a total establishment of one particular 
religious sect to the exclusion of all others."33 The Court indi­
cated just how far it was willing to extend the scope of the Es­
tablishment Clause's prohibition when it noted that "the gov­
ernmental endorsement of that prayer seems relatively 
insignificant when compared to the governmental encroach­
ments upon religion which were commonplace 200 years 
ago."34 The Court found justification for this expansion of 
scrutiny to cases involving "relatively insignificant" acts of 
encroachment in James Madison's Memorial and Remon­
strance Against Religious Assessments.35 Quoting Madison, 
30. Id. at 422. 
31. Id. at 430. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 436. 
34. Id. This acknowledgement by the Court seems very enlightening. It con­
cedes that the generation that proposed and adopted the First Amendment 
acted as if it believed the Clause allowed much greater interplay between relig­
ion and the state. It also appears to acknowledge that the Court cast aside the 
actions, beliefs and desires of this broader group of founders in favor of the 
views of Madison and Jefferson. This seems an especially suspect mode of in­
terpretation given that Jefferson played no role in drafting the Bill of Rights 
and the words of Madison most frequently relied upon by the Court were not 
written in response to the First Amendment. See discussion infra pp. 706-07. 
35. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As­
sessments, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298-306 (William T. Hutchin­
son et al. eds. , 1962). 
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the Court wrote: 
It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our 
liberties . . . . Who does not see that the same authority 
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other 
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particu­
lar sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That 
the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute 
three pence only of his property for the support of any one 
establishment, may force him to conform to any other es­
tablishment in all cases whatsoever?36 
Implicitly or explicitly, this language appears to underlie 
many of the Court's decisions to strike down actions of the 
state over the ensuing decades. As a result, it is important to 
pay particular attention to how the Court interprets this lan­
guage in Engel. 
The Court argued that Madison's warnings suggest a 
need to strike down state actions that fall well short of "estab­
lishing'' official state religions.37 The attempt to support such 
a conclusion with Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 
however, was flawed in at least two respects. 
The first problem with the Court's use of Madison's lan­
guage is that Madison wrote the text to protest a bill before 
the Virginia legislature.3 8  Implicitly, the Court would have us 
accept that because James Madison was the author of the 
Memorial and Remonstrance in Virginia and helped draft the 
First Amendment, his thoughts in the former case are appli­
cable to the latter. To establish a conclusion of this kind, the 
Court needs much more convincing evidence than it has ever 
offered. While there may have been a great deal of overlap 
between Madison's positions in both instances, that fact does 
not preclude the possibility that there may have been signifi­
cant differences also. 39 That Madison was capable of great 
36. Engel, 370 U.S. at 436. 
37. See id 
38. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance was written in opposition to a 
bill before the Virginia legislature entitled "Bill Establishing a Provision for 
Teachers of Religion" in 1785. The Bill of Rights was taken up in the first ses­
sion of Congress and ratified in 1791. See generally CHARLES F. JAMES, 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN 
VIRGINIA (1971) (describing fully the events leading up to Madison's publication 
of Memorial and Remonstrance). 
39. C£ Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91, 93 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissent­
ing) (arguing that Madison's remarks in support of the Establishment Clause, 
unlike his opposition to religious taxes in Virginia, "were less those of a dedi-
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shifts in position is clear. As one of the authors of the Feder­
alist Papers, for instance, he was one of the nation's great 
spokespersons for the federalist position; but, by the time he 
arrived at the first session of Congress, he had become a lead­
ing advocate of the anti-federalist position.40 
Second, even if the Memorial and Remonstrance did shed 
light on a document it did not address, the Court can fairly be 
said to have misinterpreted its meaning because the Court re­
lied too heavily upon the abstract language of the first sen­
tence of the quote. It fell prey to the mistake Justice Reed 
had attempted to warn about in his dissent in McCollum re­
garding Jefferson's "wall of separation between church and 
state" statement. Read by itself, the abstract language in the 
first sentence of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance can 
be interpreted as requiring super-sensitivity to any action by 
the state involving religion.41 As Justice Reed had suggested 
in McCollum, however, reliance upon such "figures of speech" 
can be very misleading.42 
Had the Court examined the remainder of the quoted 
passage, it would have concluded that Madison was not argu­
ing for super-sensitivity in every instance. Madison provided 
us with specific examples of what he considered the kinds of 
"first experiments with our liberties" that ought to arouse 
alarm.43 The actual establishment of Christianity in exclu­
sion to all other religions ought to alarm us, according to 
Madison, as should the imposition of even a small tax to sup­
port an established religion. 44 
What the Court ought to have noticed about Madison's 
examples is that they involve actual establishment of one 
kind or another-Christianity over all other kinds of religion 
cated advocate of the wisdom of such measures than those of a prudent states­
man . . .  "). Rehnquist continued to note that, in a letter to Jefferson, Madison 
suggested that he did not even feel a Bill of Rights was necessary. Id at 98. 
40. See, e.g., EDWARD MCNALL BURNS, JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (1938); NEAL RIEMER, JAMES MADISON: CREATING THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1986); ROBERT MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE 
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS (1988); c£ LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED 
FIRE OF LIBERTY, JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING , OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC (1995). 
41. See Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) 
(Reed, J., dissenting). 
42. See id 
43. Madison, supra note 35, at 300. 
44. Id 
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in the first case, and a tax to support an established church in 
the second. Madison's examples strongly suggest that the trip 
wire attached to our Establishment Clause early warning sys­
tem ought to break if, and only if, there is some legitimate 
threat whereby the state's action may lead to the establish­
ment of state religion. There is no reason to read Madison's 
words as a directive to declare state actions unconstitutional 
if those actions pose no realistic threat of a state establishing 
a church.45 
B. Creating a Test: Schempp, Allen, Walz, and Lemon 
In School District of Abington v. Schempp, 4 6 the Court 
took the first steps in laying down an Establishment Clause 
"test." The question before the Court in Schempp was 
whether the state of Pennsylvania could allow the school day 
to begin with readings from the Bible in public schools. 4 7  The 
state excused students from the reading if their parents ob­
jected. The Court held: 
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose 
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the 
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment 
exceeds the scope of the legislative power as circumscribed 
by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the 
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a 
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that nei­
ther advances nor inhibits religion.48 
The Court found that Bible reading constituted "a reli­
gious ceremony and was intended by the State to be so."49 
The state's purpose was therefore to advance religion. The 
Court again noted "that the religious practices here may be 
relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment."50 
And, once again, the Court cited Madison's language from the 
45. It is possible to conclude that when a state composes a prayer and al­
lows it to be recited in public schools that this action is sufficiently close to ac­
tual "establishment" to be a cause for alarm. The nondenominational nature of 
the prayer and the fact that participation is voluntary certainly mitigates these 
concems to some degree. Whether school prayer, under such circumstances, 
constitutes a genuine threat of establishment or is, in the Court's language, a 
relatively insignificant action, I am happy to leave for others to decide for now. 
46. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
47. ld at 205. 
48. Id. at 222. 
49. Id. at 223. 
50. ld at 225. 
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Memorial and Remonstrance to the effect that "it is proper to 
take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties"51 as justi­
fication for striking down a "relatively minor encroachment."52 
For whatever reason, the Court chose to quote only the most 
abstract language from Madison's work, neglecting to provide 
readers with Madison's own examples of the kinds of "first 
experiments with our liberties" that ought to cause alarm. 
The Court did offer another implicit justification for 
striking down "relatively minor encroachments" on the First 
Amendment when it argued that "the First Amendment, in 
its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment 
establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an estab­
lishment of religion. Thus, this Court has given the Amend­
ment a 'broad interpretation' . . . .  "53 
The implicit argument was that the First Amendment 
did not just ban the establishment of religion; it banned ac­
tions "respecting" establishment of religion. The Court was 
entitled to give a broad reading to the prohibitions of the 
First Amendment because it banned much more than just the 
actual establishment of a religion. The modifier "respecting" 
justified expanding the reach of the First Amendment to 
strike down laws that involved "relatively minor encroach­
ments" of the state into the field of religion.  
Building upon this premise, the Court shifted the nature 
of the enquiry away from the neutrality standard required in 
Everson and devised the two-part test of Schempp. The stan­
dard would no longer require the state to be neutral on the is­
sue of religion, rather the state's action must have neither the 
purpose nor effect of promoting religion. 
In several respects, the Court's analysis was once again 
flawed. First, the Court, in neither Schempp nor McGowan v. 
Marylancr offered us historical evidence to substantiate its 
interpretation of the word "respecting." The use of the word 
"respecting'' does clearly modify the terms "establishment of 
religion." Thus, the First Amendment's requirement that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
51. Id. 
52. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. 
53. Id. at 220 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1961) 
(upholding Sunday closing laws against a First Amendment challenge)). 
54. 366 U.S. 420 (1961), quoted in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 22{). 
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religion"55 implies a broader prohibition than the words, 
"Congress shall make no law establishing religion." The ex­
tent of this broadness is difficult to measure because neither 
the first Congress nor Madison left very much legislative his­
tory on point. 
Just as the inclusion of the word "respecting'' implies a 
broadening of the prohibitions of the First Amendment, so too 
the word "establishment" implies some limitations on those 
prohibitions. The failure to recognize this fact leads to the 
second flaw in the Court's interpretation. In striking down 
state actions which result in "relatively minor encroach­
ments" on religion,56 the Court appeared to be reading the 
First Amendment as if it provided that "Congress shall make 
no law respecting religion." The First Amendment does not 
prohibit Congress from making laws respecting religion; it 
prohibits Congress from making laws respecting the estab­
lishment of religion. The "establishment" modifier must be 
given the same interpretive weight as the word "respecting." 
The language appears to provide the Court with justifica­
tion for striking down laws that fall short of actual estab­
lishment, provided they could reasonably be considered laws 
respecting establishment. Had the founders wished to pro­
vide the nation with the broader prohibition insisted upon by 
the Court in Schempp, they were certainly skilled enough to 
draft such language. Representative Samuel Livermore had, 
in fact, put forth a proposal that the Amendment should read, 
"Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing 
the rights of conscience."5 7 
In Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. 
Allen,58 the Court relied on the two-part test established in 
Schempp to determine that a New York statute requiring lo­
cal school boards to loan textbooks to students free of charge 
was constitutional.59 The Court said that the "express pur­
pose" of the New York statute was the furtherance of educa­
tional opportunities for students. 60 The statute passed the 
first prong of the Schempp test because its purpose was nei-
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
56. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. 
57. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
58. 392 u.s. 236 (1968). 
59. See id at 243-44. 
60. I d. at 243. 
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ther to advance nor inhibit religion.61 The Court never explic­
itly addressed the second prong of the test, which requires 
that the "primary effect" of the statute neither advance nor 
inhibit religion. The Court did, however, reject the plaintiffs 
argument that the secular and religious components of paro­
chial education could not be separated with respect to text­
books.62 Had the Court not reached this conclusion, the stat­
ute would almost certainly have failed the second prong of the 
test. If the Court found that textbooks in all subjects were 
useful to the religious mission of sectarian education, then 
certainly the lending of a math or physics text would have 
had the "primary effect" of advancing religion. The Court, at 
least temporarily, rejected this argument.63 
Next, the Court was called upon to decide if tax exemp­
tions for religious property violated the Establishment 
Clause. In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York,64 
the appellant sought to prevent the city from granting tax ex­
emptions to religious properties that were used exclusively for 
religious purposes. Such tax exemptions "indirectly re­
quire[d] the appellant to make a contribution to religious bod­
ies"65 which violated the prohibitions of the Establishment 
Clause, according to the appellant. The Court rejected the 
claim. 
Applying the two-part test first used in Schempp, the 
Court found that "[t]he legislative purpose of the property tax 
exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of 
religion."66 Underlying this portion of the Court's decision 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 245. 
63. The Court reversed itself and rejected this conclusion in dicta in Hunt v. 
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973), noting that "[a]id normally may be thought to 
have the primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in 
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are sub­
sumed in the religious mission . . . . " This statement suggested that the Court 
would no longer look at the content of instructional materials but rather at the 
content of the overall education to decide if the instructional materials aid the 
religious mission. See id at 749 (upholding, on other grounds, a statute that 
allowed the state to issue revenue bonds that were used to finance a capital pro­
ject for Baptist College at Charleston); see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 
(1975) (Using this language, the Court declared the portion of a Pennsylvania 
statute that provided instructional material and equipment to religious schools 
unconstitutional.). 
64. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
65. Id. at 667. 
66. Id. at 672. 
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was the Court's recognition that New York "has not singled 
out one particular church or religious group or even churches 
as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of reli­
gious worship within a broad class of property owned by non­
profit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, li­
braries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and 
patriotic groups."67 
Next, the Court turned to the second "effect" prong of the 
Schempp test. The "effect" that the Court said must be 
avoided was "excessive government entanglement with relig­
ion."68 Excessive entanglement occurred when the statute in 
question results in a relationship between church and state 
that requires "official and continuing surveillance" by the 
government of church affairs.69 The Court found that "[t]he 
exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement 
between church and state and far less than taxation of 
churches."70 
Finally, the Court pulled together the various prongs of 
the Establishment Clause test it had begun articulating in 
Schempp and Walz into a single three-prong test in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman. 71 In Lemon, two states, Rhode Island and Penn­
sylvania, passed legislation that would have supplemented 
the pay of religious school teachers (Rhode Island) or reim­
bursed religious schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and 
instructional materials (Pennsylvania). 72 In both instances, 
the statutes prohibited the state from spending tax revenues 
to support religious instruction, texts, or instructional mate­
rials. Teachers in Rhode Island had to sign a statement 
pledging not to teach a course in religion while receiving sal­
ary supplements. 73 In Pennsylvania, the state required par­
ticipating schools to maintain financial records that demon­
strated the cost of secular education, with such records being 
subject to state audit. 74 
The Court struck down the statutes in both states. 75 The 
67. Id. at 673. 
68. Id. at 674. 
69. Id. at 675. 
70. Walz, 397 U.S. at 676. 
71. 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
72. Id. at 606-07. 
73. I d. at 608. 
74. Id. at 609-10. 
75. Seeid. at 607. 
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three part "Lemon test" required that "[f]irst, the statute 
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in­
hibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces­
sive government entanglement with religion."'76 The Court 
found no violation of the secular legislative intent prong and 
declined an analysis of the primary effect prong.7 7  Instead, it 
moved directly to the third "excessive entanglement" prong of 
the inquiry.78  
In both Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, the Court 
claimed that the essential mission of the sectarian schools 
was instruction in religious faith. 79 It also claimed that the 
teachers in such schools were "under religious control and 
discipline."80 These factors led the Court to conclude that 
teachers "teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith 
and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience 
great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral."81  In order to 
be "certain" that teachers in religious schools keep the reli­
gious and secular components of education separate, the state 
would be required to engage in "comprehensive, discriminat­
ing, and continuing state surveillance" of the religious insti­
tution. 82 As an example of such surveillance, the Court cited 
Rhode Island's requirement that the state continually deter­
mine what portion of the school's budget was directed to reli­
gious as opposed to secular education. 83 In Pennsylvania, the 
statute failed not only because the state provided continuing 
aid directly to the religious schools, but also because the 
terms of the grant required the state to audit the financial re­
cords of the schools . 84 All of these monitoring provisions led to 
"excessive entanglement" between church and state, accord­
ing to the Court. 85 
In his dissent, Justice White argued that the Court had 
76. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)) 
(citations omitted in original). 
77. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14. 
78. See id. at 614. 
79. Jd. at 618. 
80. Id. at 617. 
81. Jd. at 618. 
82. Id. at 619. 
83. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620. 
84. See id. at 621-22. 
85. Id. (describing this "entanglement" as "an intimate and continuing rela­
tionship between church and state"). 
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created a test that imposed contradictory requirements, 
which states could not pass:86 
The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State 
and the parochial schools. The State cannot finance secu­
lar instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the 
same classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not 
be so taught-a promise the school and its teachers are 
quite willing and on this record able to give-and enforces 
it, it is then entangled in the 'no entanglement' aspect of 
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.87 
History proved Justice White's criticism trenchant. As he 
suggested, Lemon created a catch-22 for states seeking to 
provide aid for children attending religious schools. If states 
failed to provide the "comprehensive, discriminating, and con­
tinuing state surveillance" needed to guarantee that teachers 
of secular subjects were not influenced by religious beliefs, 
they failed the "primary effect" prong of Lemon.88 If the state 
did provide the requisite surveillance so that it could insure 
aid was not diverted to religious purposes, it failed the "ex­
cessive entanglement" prong of Lemon. 
Finally, the Court said that a ''broader base of entangle­
ment" was "presented by the divisive political potential"89 of 
both states' programs. The threat of political divisiveness fol­
lowed from the fact that partisans of different religious faiths, 
as well as those that shared no faith, would fight not only 
over resources, but also over whether the state should even be 
engaged in funding such programs. For all of these reasons, 
the Court declared both states' statutes unconstitutional on 
the grounds that both involved excessive entanglement of 
church and state. 90 
86. See id at 668. 
87. Id. 
88. The Court's "unwillingness to accept the District Court's express find­
ings that on the evidence before it none of the teachers here involved mixed re­
ligious and secular instruction" made the hurdle of the "primary effect" prong 
even more difficult to address. Id at 666 (White, J., dissenting). 
89. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. 
90. Id at 625. 
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C. The Post-Lemon Cases 
1. Construction Grants for Religious Colleges: Tilton v. 
Richardson 
715 
In Tilton v. Richardson,91 the Court applied the Lemon 
test to a case in which the federal government provided grant 
funds that Catholic colleges and universities used to construct 
buildings. The legislation prohibited the funds from being 
used to build facilities that would be used for religious pur­
poses.92 The federal government also retained a twenty-year 
interest in any facility constructed with the funds.93 If the col­
leges or universities violated the twenty-year restriction, the 
government was "entitled to recover an amount equal to the 
proportion of its present value that the federal grant bore to 
the original cost of the facility."94 
Applying the first prong, the Court found that the gov­
ernment had the legitimate secular objective of providing fa­
cilities for higher education. 95 
As to the second prong, the appellant claimed that the 
legislation had the primary effect of advancing religion be­
cause it freed up money for religious purposes that would 
otherwise have been spent on buildings.96 The Court ac­
knowledged that the fungibility of money inevitably meant 
that the government provided some aid to religious institu­
tions, but it denied that this fact proved that the legislation's 
primary effect was to advance religion. 9 7  Moreover, the Court 
noted that none of the colleges had violated the restrictions 
that prohibited them from using the funds to build facilities 
that were used for religious purposes.98 
Unlike Lemon, the Court found that religion did not 
permeate "the secular education provided by church-related 
colleges," and that the religious and secular educational func-
91. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). Tilton was actually decided on the same day as 
Lemon, but I am treating it as a post-Lemon case because it was decided accord­
ing to the test established in Lemon. 
92. Id. at 675. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. See id. at 679. 
96. Seeid. 
97. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681-82. 
98. Id. at 680. 
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tions were separable.99 This finding appeared to rest on the 
fact that the colleges in question made no attempt to regulate 
the content of courses, and that professors retained sole con­
trol over such content. 100 The Court dismissed documents 
that showed "certain religious restrictions on what could be 
taught" because "other evidence showed that these restric­
tions were not in fact enforced and that the schools were 
characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather 
than religious indoctrination."101 
The Court did find the twenty-year restriction on the use 
of the funds unconstitutional, although it did not indicate on 
what grounds. 102 The Court said that the federal government 
continues to retain an interest "while the building has sub­
stantive value" because they were built, in part, with federal 
funds. 103 Finally, the Court turned to the third prong of the 
Lemon test, "excessive entanglement," and again found no 
constitutional violation. 104 The Court distinguished Tilton 
from Lemon primarily on the grounds that religion was less 
likely to permeate secular education at the college level than 
at the grade school level. 105 This conclusion was based on the 
Court's observation that college and university professors 
were less likely to be influenced by the fact that they were 
teaching at religious institutions rather than at elementary 
and secondary schools. 106 The Court also noted that "common 
observance" supported the view that college students were 
less susceptible to religious indoctrination than elementary 
and secondary age school children. 107 As a result, the Court 
found that government aid to higher education would far less 
likely support religious activities than aid to elementary and 
secondary schools. 108 There was less chance of excessive en­
tanglement because the government would not have to moni­
tor the schools to make certain that the funds were not being 
99. Id 
100. Id. at 681-82. 
101. Id at 681. 
102. Id at 683. 
103. 403 U.S. at 683. 
104. Id. at 688. 
105. Id at 686-87. 
106. See id. at 686. 
107. Id. 
108. Id at 686. 
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2. State Funds for Maintenance, Tuition Reimbursment, 
and Tax Relief: Committee for Public Education & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist,110 New York State passed legislation that provided 
three kinds of financial aid programs to non public elementary 
and secondary schools. The first program provided direct 
money grants to schools to be used for maintenance and re­
pairs of schools. m  In order to qualify for this aid, schools had 
to be nonpublic and nonprofit and serve a high concentration 
of pupils from low-income families. 112 The maintenance and 
repair grants were limited to fifty percent of comparable ex­
penses in the public schools. 113 The second program estab­
lished a tuition reimbursement plan for parents of children 
attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. 114 To 
qualify, a parent's taxable income had to be less than 
$5000.115 The third program was designed to give tax relief to 
parents failing to qualify for tuition reimbursement. 116 The 
tax relief was graduated and cut off completely once the tax­
payer's earnings exceeded $25,000.117 Eighty-five percent of 
the students in question attended nonpublic religious schools, 
practically all being Catholic schools. 118 The Court applied the 
Lemon test to each section of the statute separately. 
As to all three sections, the Court concluded that "each 
measure is adequately supported by legitimate, nonsectarian 
state interests."119 Thus, none of the three types of aid vio­
lated the first prong of the Lemon test. 
The Court found that the maintenance and repair section 
of the statute violated the second prong of the Lemon test, as 
109. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687. 
110. 413 u.s. 756 (1973). 
111 .  Id. at 762. 
112 .  Id. at 762-63. 
113. Id. at 763. 
114. Id. 764. 
115. Id. 
116. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 765. 
117. Id. at 765-66. 
118. Id. at 768. 
119. Id. at 773. 
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the funds had the primary effect of advancing religion. 120 The 
Court noted that no controls were exercised which would have 
guaranteed that the money was spent on facilities that were 
used solely for nonreligious purposes.121 The Court distin­
guished this case from Everson (bus fares), Allen (lending 
textbooks), and 111ton (construction of buildings) on the 
grounds that in all three of those cases, the secular aspect of 
the activity could be separated from the religious.122 The 
Court recognized that the kind of aid provided in cases like 
Everson, Allen, and Tilton "served indirectly and incidentally 
to promote the religious function by rendering it more likely 
that children would attend sectarian schools and by freeing 
the budgets of those schools for use in other nonsecular ar­
eas."123 But the Court argued that incidental benefits to reli­
gious schools had never been grounds for finding a statute 
unconstitutional.124 
The Court noted that the state might have claimed that it 
could insure that the maintenance and repair funds did not 
have the primary effect of advancing religion because they 
were limited to fifty percent of the amount spent on compara­
ble public schools.125 The apparent underlying assumption 
was that sectarian schools would spend at least fifty percent 
of the public school's budget on secular upkeep; thus, the 
maintenance cost supported these nonreligious activities.126 
The Court rejected this "statistical" argument insisting that 
the state had to actually demonstrate, rather than provide a 
statistical guarantee, that its funds were not being used for 
religious activities. 127 
120. Id at 774. 
121. Id. 
122. Nyquist, 4 13 U.S. at 775. 
123. Id. 
124. Id at 775. 
125. Id. at 777. 
126. Id 
127. Id. at 776-79. The Court cited Earley v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), a 
companion case to Lemon, as authority for this portion of its decision. In Ear­
ley, the Court rejected a "statistical guarantee" argument similar to that found 
in Lemon. Id at 620. There, the state of Rhode Island authorized fifteen per­
cent salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects. Id at 607. Rhode Is­
land had claimed that it was statistically true that teachers in Catholic schools 
spent at least fifteen percent of their time teaching secular subjects. I d. at 607-
09. The Court rejected this argument on two grounds. See id. at 615-20. First, 
it said that the state could not avoid the Establishment Clause violation by 
merely assuming that its teachers could separate their religious beliefs from 
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It is worth noting that the Court offered virtually no ar­
gument to support this conclusion. The Court cited Early v. 
DiCensd28 in which it had struck down a Rhode Island law 
that provided salary supplements to teachers of secular sub­
jects in religious schools on the grounds that the state could 
not assume "that its teachers would succeed in segregating 
'their religious beliefs from their secular educational respon­
sibilities."'129 However, the statistical argument in Nyquist 
did not rely upon teachers being able to separate their reli­
gious beliefs from their secular educational functions. It 
claimed, instead, that teachers spend a certain percentage of 
any school day teaching nonreligious subjects that are not 
subject to influence by religious beliefs. 130 If the subj ect mat­
ter is not susceptible to religious interpretation, separation is 
unnecessary. The Court was merely required to recognize 
that teachers spend at least fifty percent of their day address­
ing nonreligious subjects. If the Court had wished to refute 
this claim it might have offered some evidence that Jews, 
Christians, and atheists teach geometry and algebra differ­
ently. Had the Court presented such evidence, it might also 
have enlightened us as to which of these approaches was ap­
propriate for public schools where, presumably, teachers also 
have beliefs about religion. Having found a violation of the 
second prong of the Lemon test, the Court declined to apply 
the "excessive entanglement" prong of the test. 131 
Turning to the tuition reimbursement section of the stat­
ute, the Court also found a violation of the "effect" test under 
Lemon.132 The state, relying on Everson (bus fare) and Allen 
(textbooks), argued that because the reimbursement funds 
were paid directly to parents, the "wall of separation" be­
tween church and state had been maintained. 133 The Court 
acknowledged that it had considered payments to parents 
rather than to the religious schools a factor in deciding Ever­
son and Allen, but it maintained that that fact alone did not 
their secular educational responsibilities. Jd. at 616-18. Second, it claimed that 
statistical guarantees would open the door to extensive subsidies of religious 
education by the state. !d. at 618-20. 
128. 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
129. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 778 (citing Earley, 403 U.S. at 619). 
130. Id. at 779. 
131. Jd. at 780. 
132. Jd. 
133. Jd. at 781 n.37. 
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provide per se immunity to such aid. 134 Payment to parents 
rather than to schools was only one of many factors to be con­
sidered in such cases. 135 
One of those many factors was that bus fares and text­
books, at least textbooks that addressed secular subj ects, 
were distinguishable on the grounds that they did not support 
any religious function. Textbooks and bus fares were no dif­
ferent than police and fire protection, in that they did nothing 
to further religion. 136 In the statute under review in Nyquist, 
however, the Court stated that New York made no attempt to 
ensure that the monies provided under the tuition grants 
aided only secular education.13 7 Moreover, the program was 
limited to parents whose children attended private schools, 
the vast majority of which were religious schools.138 This 
meant that the aid was being used to further religious educa­
tion. 139 The very purpose of the tuition reimbursement plan 
was to assure that economically depressed parents could af­
ford to have a sectarian school option for their children. 140 
The tuition reimbursement program therefore had the "pri­
mary effect" of advancing religion.141 
Finally, the Court addressed the tax relief portion of the 
New York statute. New York defended the tax relief program 
on two grounds. 142 The first defense was premised upon the 
argument that the state made payments directly to parents 
and not to schools. 143 The Court dismissed this defense by re­
ferring readers to its reply to the same defense in the tuition 
reimbursement portion of the case. 1 4 
In its second defense, the state claimed that the tax cred­
its were no different than the tax exemptions that the Court 
had previously upheld in Walz.145 The Court rejected this 
134. /d. at 781. 
135. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781. 
136. Id at 781-82. 
137. Id at 784. 
138. Id 
139. Id at 789. 
140. See id. 
141. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785. The Court also said that it was important 
that in Allen and Everson the aid was offered to all schoolchildren whether they 
were in public or private schools. /d. at 782 n.38. 
142. Id at 793. 
143. Id. 
144. /d. at 790-91.  
145. Id at 791. 
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claim on several grounds, arguing that the tax exemption 
granted to church property in Walz had a long history of ac­
ceptance by all fifty states and Congress, whereas the tax 
credits offered to parents in Nyquist had only recently been 
enacted. 146 The reasoning underlying the long history of tax 
exemptions for church property was more important. Accord­
ing to the Court, tax policy had been used as a means of reli­
gious oppression, 14 7 and tax exemptions for church property 
were merely evidence of the state's attempt to remain neutral 
with respect to religious issues. The Court stated that "spe­
cial tax benefits" did not comply with the principle of neutral­
ity, since they "aid and advance" religion, violating the second 
prong of Lemon.148 As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his 
'dissent on behalf of three members of the Court, this anoma­
lous decision would have us believe that tax exemptions pro­
vided directly to churches do less to advance religion than do 
tax credits to parents who send their children (largely in 
search of secular education) to religious schools. 149 
3. Textbooks, Instructional Materials and Equipment: 
Meek v. Pittenger 
In Meek v. Pittenger,150 the state of Pennsylvania was 
sued for enacting two acts that provided aid to religious 
schools. The first of these two statutes, Act 195, provided 
such schools with textbooks, instructional materials, and 
equipment (projectors, maps movies, charts, etc.) . 151 Review­
ing the portion of Act 195 that provided for the loan of text­
books, the Court found the statute constitutional, 152 relying 
upon its earlier decisions in Everson153 and Allen.154 As in 
Everson and Allen, the Court said that states were not pro­
hibited from spending tax funds to provide certain services 
such as bus fare (Everson) or textbooks (Allen), provided they 
did so as part of a general program that pays for all students, 
146. Id. at 792. 
147. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793-94. 
148. Id. at 793. 
149. Id. at 808 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
150. 421 u.s. 349 ( 1975). 
151. Id. at 353-55. 
152. Id. 362. 
153. 330 u.s. 1 ( 1947). 
154. 392 u.s. 235 (1968). 
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whether in public or private school. 155 As in Allen, the Court 
stressed that the Pennsylvania statute loaned books directly 
to students and their parents rather than to parochial 
schools, so that the financial benefit was to parents, not to 
schools. Again, as in Allen, the Court conceded that when the 
state provides free textbooks to children attending religious 
schools, such children become more likely to attend parochial 
schools, but it denied that this fact alone was sufficient to 
render the statute unconstitutional. 156 
Turning to the portion of Act 195 that loaned instruc­
tional material and equipment directly to religious schools, 
the Court declared the law unconstitutional. 15 7 Applying the 
first prong of the Lemon test, the Court found no problem 
with the state's secular legislative purpose. 158 The Court 
agreed that, in providing instructional material to students, 
the state was merely attempting to assure "ample opportu­
nity to develop their intellectual capacities."159 
Applying the second prong of Lemon, the Court found 
that, because the state loaned instructional materials directly 
to religious schools, the materials had the "unconstitutional 
primary effect of advancing religion."160 The Court pointed 
out that seventy-five percent of the schools that received the 
aid under the program were "church-related or religiously af­
filiated."161 The Court acknowledged that a state may, as part 
of general legislation, include "church-related schools in pro­
grams providing bus transportation, school lunches, and pub­
lic health facilities."162 The state could provide such services 
to religious institutions because the services were "secular 
and nonideological" and "unrelated to the primary, religious­
oriented educational function of the sectarian school."163 
Moreover, according to the Court, the benefits of such services 
were "indirect and incidental."164 
155. Meek, 421 U.S. at 359-60. 
156. ld at 360. 
157. I d. at 363 ("But we agree with the appellants that the direct loan of in­
structional material and equipment has the unconstitutional primary effect of 
advancing religion . . . .  "). 
158. Id. 
159. ld 
160. ld. 
161. Meek, 421 U.S. at 364. 
162. Id 
163. ld. 
164. Id. 
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In contrast, the Court claimed that the "massive aid" 
provided for by the instructional aid program was "neither 
indirect nor incidental."165 This conclusion was premised upon 
the fact that Pennsylvania authorized just under $12 million 
of direct aid in the form of instructional materials166 which 
"flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a 
substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the reli­
gious mission."16 7 The Court came to this conclusion despite 
acknowledging that "the material and equipment that are the 
subjects of the loan-maps, charts, and laboratory equipment, 
for example-are 'self-polic[ing], in that starting as secular, 
nonideological and neutral, they will not change in use."'168 
Given the size of the loans, and the fact that they were made 
directly to religious schools, the Court concluded that the in­
structional aid could not be limited to the secular functions of 
the schools without supporting the religious functions. 169 The 
Court therefore concluded that the aid had the effect of ad­
vancing religion. 1 70 
The Court insisted that the $12 million in aid, coupled 
with the religious nature of the schools into which it was 
channeled, made the instructional materials portion of the 
statute unconstitutional. 1 71 This conclusion cannot be squared 
with the textbook portion of the case. Because the state spent 
$4,670,000 on the textbooks it loaned the schools, Justice 
Brennan's dissent (with respect to the textbook portion of the 
decision) correctly charges the plurality with failing to "ex­
plain how the [cost] factor weighs determinatively against the 
validity of the instructional materials loan provisions, and not 
also against the validity of the textbook loan provisions."1 72 
Contrary to the Court's apparent assumption, nothing about 
the Establishment Clause indicates that the founders in­
tended to set a dollar amount that would trigger the provi-
165. Id. at 350. 
166. Id 
167. Meek, 42 1 U.S. at 366 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 
(1973)). 
168. ld. at 365 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 660 (E.D. Pa. 
1974)). 
169. Id. at 365-66. 
170. See id. (citing Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743). 
171.  See id. 
172. I d. at 378. 
724 SANTA CLARA LA W  REVIEW Vol: 44 
• 1 73 SlOn. 
Nor was there any conceivable distinction between the 
textbooks and instructional materials in terms of the Court's 
ability to "separate secular educational functions from the 
predominantly religious role performed by . . .  church-related 
elementary and secondary schools."1 74 If textbooks are not 
converted to a religious purpose merely because they are de­
livered to schools in which religion is so ubiquitous that a 
significant percentage of its function is subsumed in the reli­
gious mission, then certainly neither are instructional mate­
rials. The Court conceded this idea when it acknowledged 
that instructional materials "are self polic[ing], in that start­
ing as secular, nonideological and neutral, they will not 
h . ,1 75 c ange 1n use. 
Because instructional aid was provided directly to reli­
gious schools, this case, at first glance, logically appears dis­
tinguishable from Everson and Allen. Justice Rehnquist's 
dissent casts serious doubt upon this assertion. Rehnquist 
argued:  
[T]he fact that the school is  the bailee [cannot] be re­
garded as constitutionally determinative. In the textbook 
loan program upheld in Allen, supra, the private schools 
were responsible for transmitting the book requests to the 
Board of Education and were permitted to store the loaned 
books on their premises. I fail to see how the instructional 
materials and equipment program can be distinguished in 
any significant respect. Under both programs "ownership 
remains, at least technically, in the State."176 
Moreover, the Court did not appear to premise its conclu­
sion upon this distinction, focusing instead on the amount of 
the aid and the religious nature of the schools that received 
the aid. But neither of these elements were distinguishable 
from the textbook issue. The Court left states in an anoma­
lous position-able constitutionally to provide religious 
schools with maps printed within books but unable to provide 
173. Madison in his Memorial and Remonstrance, a paper that the Court of­
ten considers when seeking to interpret the Establishment Clause, suggested 
that forcing a "citizen to contribute a three pence of his property" would violate 
the principle of anti-establishment. See Madison, supra note 35, at 300. 
174. Meek, 421 U.S. at 365. 
175. Id. at 366 (quoting Meek, 374 F. Supp. at 660). 
176. Id. at 391 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)) (cita­
tions omitted in original). 
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maps which pulled down in front of blackboards. 1 7 7  
Next, the Court considered Act 194, which authorized the 
state to supply professional staff that provided auxiliary ser­
vices (remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counsel­
ing and testing, speech, and hearing services) directly to non­
public school children.1 78 The Court noted that "the services 
[were] provided only on the non public school premises, and 
only when 'requested by nonpublic school representatives."'1 79 
The Court conceded the right of the state "to make free auxil­
iary services available to all students in the Commonwealth, 
including those who attend church-related schools."180 The is­
sue was merely whether such services could be provided on 
the religious school's grounds. 181 
Once again, the Court did not question the state's secular 
legislative purpose or the primary effect of the Act, thus obvi­
ating the need to apply the first and second prongs of the 
Lemon test.182 The Court, however, did find a violation of the 
third prong of Lemon. 183 
The Court rejected the district court's finding that "no 
continuing supervision of the personnel providing auxiliary 
services would be necessary to establish that Act 194's secu­
lar limitations were observed" or to ensure that a teacher did 
not "'succumb to sectarianization of his or her professional 
work."'184 Citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court argued that 
the state could not rely upon the professionalism of teachers 
to ensure they did not succumb to the desire to "inculcate re­
ligion."185 Instead the Court held that the state would be 
forced to maintain "a comprehensive, discriminating, and con­
tinuing state surveillance" to ensure that the First Amend­
ment was respected.18 6 However, the Court argued that if the 
state were to do so, it would violate the third prong of the 
Lemon test, which required the state to avoid "excessive en-
177. See id at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
178. I d. at 367. 
179. I d. (citing Dep't of Ed., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Guidelines for 
Administration of Acts 194 and 195 § 13). 
180. Meek, 421 U.S. at 368 n. 17. 
181. See id. at 368. 
182. Id. at 367-68. 
183. See id. at 372. 
184. Id. (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1974)). 
185. Id. at 369. 
186. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-
19 (1971)). 
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tanglements" between church and state. 1 8 7  
Lemon presented a significantly different set of facts, 
however, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent. 1 8 8  In 
Lemon, the state attempted to supplement the salaries of 
teachers who were employed by the religious schools. 1 89 
There, the Court had specifically emphasized that, by virtue 
of the fact that religious schools employed them, the teachers 
were under "religious control and discipline."190 In Meek, the 
state employed the teachers, and their only connection to the 
religious school was that they went there to assist children. 191 
In addition, Act 194 specifically limited the substantive areas 
that the public school officials could address to those that "are 
presently or hereafter provided for in public school[s]."192 The 
district court's evidentiary record clarified that this restric­
tion had been fully observed. 193 
As Justice White had predicted in his dissent in Lemon, 
the "primary effect" and "excessive entanglement" prongs of 
Lemon were combining to become tests that its takers could 
only fail.194 When Pennsylvania provided language in the 
statute that merely limited the instructional materials to "the 
subjects and activities prescribed by the standards of the 
State Board of Education,"195 without providing some monitor­
ing provision that guaranteed the aid would not advance re­
ligion, it failed the primary effect test. And, when the state 
included the monitoring provisions necessary to guarantee 
that professional staff and auxiliary services did not have the 
"primary effect of advancing religion," it failed the "excessive 
entanglement" test. Not surprisingly, Justice Rehnquist 
questioned whether the possibility of meeting the entangle­
ment test was now anything more than "a promise to the ear 
to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent 
bequest in a pauper's will."196 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 393 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
189. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617. 
190. Id. 
191. Meek, 421 U.S. at 352-53. 
192. Id. at 393 (quoting Act 194, § l(b)). 
193. Id. at 368-69, 392 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
194. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668. 
195. Meek, 421 U.S. at 363. 
196. Id. at 394 (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jack­
son, J., concurring)). 
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4. Tax Deductions for School Expenses: Mueller v. Allen 
In Mueller v. Allen, 197 the Court began to consider allow­
ing states to increase their level of support, pursuant to gen­
eral welfare programs, for children attending religious 
schools.198 In Mueller, the Court was asked to decide whether 
the state of Minnesota could constitutionally allow taxpayers 
whose children attended religious schools to deduct expenses 
associated with such education (regular, summer, and reme­
dial tuition, cost of various types of rental equipment, pencils, 
and notebooks, etc.). 199 
In applying the first "secular legislative purpose" prong of 
Lemon, the Court found no constitutional problem with the 
statute.200 The state's interest in educating its children, the 
significant reduction in cost to the state for children attend­
ing religious schools, and the "wholesome competition" that 
private schools generated for public schools all provided the 
state with sufficient secular purpose.201 
The more difficult challenge for the legislation was the 
second prong, the "primary effect" test. The Court found 
three reasons why the tax deduction did not have the "pri­
mary effect" of advancing religion. First, the education ex­
pense deduction was only one of many deductions available 
under the statute.202 Additional deductions were available for 
medical expenses and charitable contributions.203 The Court 
inferred that the broad range of deductions indicated that 
Minnesota had not singled out parents of children attending 
religious schools for special treatment.204 Moreover, the Court 
claimed that states were entitled to "substantial deference" 
when deciding how to equalize tax burdens among its citi-
205 zens. 
197. 463 u.s. 388 (1983). 
198. Id. 
199. See id. at 391. 
200. Id. at 394-95. 
201. Id. at 395. 
202. Id. at 396. 
203. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396. 
204. Although the Court does not cite Lemon, it seems to suggest that the 
wide range of deductions ensured that Minnesota avoided the problem Pennsyl­
vania faced when it "singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic 
benefit." Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 ( 1973). 
205. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396. The Court distinguished this case from Ny­
quist on the grounds that the Nyquist Court had "expressed considerable doubt" 
that the tax benefits in that case "could be regarded as part of a genuine system 
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Second, the Court argued that it was a "material consid­
eration" that any benefit that might result to the parochial 
schools resulted from the "numerous private choices of indi­
vidual parents," rather than from direct assistance to the 
schools. 206 This reasoning signified that no "imprimatur of 
state approval" had been "conferred on any particular relig­
ion, or on religion generally."207 The Court further said, "[t]he 
historic purposes of the Clause simply do not encompass the 
sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by 
the private choices of individual parents, that eventually 
flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax 
benefit at issue in this case."208 
Third, the Court argued that the availability of the de­
ductions to all parents, including those whose children at­
tended public and nonsectarian private schools, indicated "an 
important index of secular effect."209 The Court took pains to 
distinguish Mueller from Nyquist in this respect. In Nyquist, 
New York provided tuition deductions for a limited class of 
individuals whose children attended private schools .  210 In 
Mueller, deductions were available for parents of children at­
tending both private and public schools.211 The Court argued 
that the Minnesota legislation was akin to Allen and Everson 
in that the aid was part of a program that benefited "a broad 
spectrum of citizens."212 
In response to this third argument, appellants claimed 
that the Court ought to ignore the facial neutrality of the 
statute because, at least with respect to the tuition deduction, 
the statute primarily benefited parents of children in reli­
gious schools. 213 The Court swept aside such statistical evi­
dence on the grounds that it failed to "provide the certainty 
that this field stands in need of."214 The Court stated, "[ w ]e 
would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality 
of tax laws." Id. at 396 n.6. Most of the tax benefits in Nyquist were better un­
derstood as mere tuition grants according to the Court. 
206. Id at 399. 
207. See id (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 236, 274 (1981)). 
208. Id. at 400. 
209. Id at 397 (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274). 
2 10. See id at 398. 
211 .  See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398. 
212. Id at 397 (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274). 
2 13.  Id. at 400. 
2 14. Id. at 401. 
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of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent 
to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits 
under the law."215 Such an approach makes sense, since noth­
ing about the First Amendment suggests that its application 
varies depending upon this sort of statistical argument. The 
appellant's approach would force the Court to decide that the 
First Amendment was violated only when some arbitrary per­
centage of participants took deductions for sectarian tuition. 
The Court also argued that there was evidence that some 
public school parents were able to take advantage of the tui­
tion deduction and all public school parents were able to take 
deductions for other items under the statute.216 
Finally, in response to the appellants' disparate impact 
argument, the Court argued, "whatever unequal effect may be 
attributed to the statutory classification can fairly be re­
garded as a rough return for the [savings] . . .  provided to the 
State and all taxpayers by parents sending ·their children to 
parochial schools."217 
Turning to the third prong of Lemon, the Court claimed it 
had "no difficulty in concluding that the Minnesota statute 
does not 'excessively entangle' the state in religion."21 8  The 
Court found no evidence that the state would be required to 
maintain "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing 
state surveillance" to insure that the tax deduction statute 
did not violate the Establishment Clause. 219 The only possible 
monitoring requirement would be to insure that the textbooks 
for which parents took deductions were limited to secular 
purposes. The Court claimed that the situation here did not 
differ substantially from Allen, where the state had an ongo­
ing duty to monitor whether the textbooks loaned to students 
attending religious schools were limited to secular use.220 
As to the "political divisiveness" variation of the "exces­
sive entanglement" prong, the Court cut short any discussion 
of the test by holding that the issue only arose in cases 
2 15. Id. 
2 16. I d. at 401 n.9. The Court also stated that parents of public school chil­
dren were able to take advantage of the deductions for things like summer 
school programs, private tutoring, and schools supplies, all of which were de­
ductible items under the statute. I d. at 391 n.2. 
217. Muel er, 463 U.S. at 402. 
2 18. I d. at 403. 
2 19. ld. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)). 
220. See id. 
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"where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools 
or to teachers in parochial schools."221 
Justice Marshall's dissent, on behalf of Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, argued that the deductions had the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion.222 This conclusion fol­
lowed from the fact that the overwhelming majority of par­
ents who took the deduction had children in sectarian 
schools.  223 He argued that the majority had erred in claiming 
that taking such "statistical evidence" into account would 
lead to constitutional uncertainty.224 In the dissent's view, 
"The only factual inquiry necessary is the same as that em­
ployed in Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon: whether the deduction 
permitted for tuition expenses primarily benefits those who 
send their children to religious schools."225 
Just how the dissent would define "primarily" was un­
clear. Marshall did not indicate what percentage of children 
needed to attend public schools in order for such a deduction 
to be found constitutional. Nor did he cite any evidence to 
support the claim that the Establishment Clause was in­
tended to turn on such an inquiry. The dissenters provided 
some portent of how they would define the term "primarily" 
when they indicated that they were prepared to overturn Al­
len. Marshall claimed that the Court, in deciding Allen, had 
[B]elieved at that time that it lacked sufficient experience 
to determine "based solely on judicial notice " that "the 
process of secular and religious training are so intertwined 
that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public 
[will always be] instrumental in the teaching of religion." 
This basis for distinguishing secular instructional materi­
als and secular textbooks is simply untenable, and is in­
consistent with many of our more recent decisions con­
cerning state aid to parochial schools. 2 26 
The decision in Allen was premised on the fact that the 
loan of textbooks to children attending religious schools was 
part of a general program in which books were loaned to all 
children in the state regardless of whether they attended pub-
221. Id at 403 n.11.  
222. Id 409 (Marshall, J.,  dissenting). 
223. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 410-11.  
224. Id. at 409 (Marshall, J . ,  dissenting). 
225. Id. at 409-10. 
226. Id at 415. 
2004 SCHOOL VOUCHERS 731 
lie or religious schools. 227 There can be little doubt that in 
1968, the overwhelming majority of students in New York 
were attending public schools. Hence, the benefit of the text­
book loan program fell "primarily" to parents of students at­
tending public schools. Nonetheless, even in that situation 
the dissenters indicated they now found a violation of the 
"primary effect" test. 22 8 The "primarily" threshold evidently 
meant (in the view of the dissenters) that no aid whatsoever 
could find its way to religious schools regardless of how inci­
dental or de minimis it was. 
5. Public Teachers in Religious Schools: Grand Rapids v. 
Ball and Aguilar v. Felton 
In Grand Rapids v. Balf29 and Aguilar v. Felton,230 the 
Court revisited the issues raised in Meek v. Pittenger.231 In 
Ball, Michigan adopted two programs (Shared Time and 
Community Education) that offered educational programs to 
students in private sectarian and nonsectarian schools. 232 
Ball's Shared Time program offered remedial and enrichment 
classes in mathematics, reading, art, music, and physical 
education.233 Teachers in the Shared Time program were full­
time public school employees who went to religious schools to 
teach the remedial and enrichment classes.234 
The Community Education program, available on the 
grounds of religious schools, offered classes in arts and crafts, 
home economics, Spanish, gymnastics, yearbook production, 
Christmas arts and crafts, drama, newspaper, humanities, 
chess, model building, and nature appreciation.235 Although 
hired as public employees for the limited purposes of the 
Community Education program, virtually all teachers in the 
program were "otherwise employed full time by the same" re­
ligious school in which they taught.23 6 
227. See id. 
228. Id. at 414-15. 
229. 473 u.s. 373 (1985). 
230. 473 u.s. 402 ( 1985). 
231. 421 U.S. 349 ( 1975). 
232. Ball, 473 U.S. at 375. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 375-76. 
235. Id. at 376-77. 
236. Id at 377 (quoting Ams. United for Separation Between Church & State 
v. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (W.D. Mich. 1982)). 
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Similarly, in Aguilar, New York was using federal funds 
to pay public school employees to teach and provide guidance 
counseling in parochial schools. 23 7 The state targeted the pro­
gram to poor children in low-income neighborhoods and in­
cluded remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathemat­
ics, English as a second language, and guidance services. 238 
The one major difference between AguHar and Ball was that 
New York provided a monitoring mechanism to ensure that 
teachers did not indoctrinate students with religious beliefs.239 
To that end, New York provided for "occasional unannounced 
supervisory visits" by supervisors of the program.240 
With respect to the programs in Ball, the Court found 
three violations of the "primary effect test."241 Relying upon 
Meek v. Pittenger,242 the Court found first that teachers "in­
fluenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of the religious 
schools in which they work, may subtly or overtly indoctri­
nate the students in particular religious tenets at public ex­
pense."243 Second, the Court said that having public teachers 
in sectarian schools created a "symbolic union of church and 
state . . .  [that] threatens to convey a message of state support 
for religion to students and to the general public."244 Third, 
the Court found that the programs support sectarian schools 
by relieving them of the duty they otherwise had to teach 
1 b. t 245 secu ar su �ec s. 
In Aguilar, the Court insisted that the supervisory sys­
tem established to insure that teachers did not indoctrinate 
students in religion resulted in "excessive entanglement" in 
violation of the third prong of Lemon. 24 6 The Court also found 
two- additional grounds for a violation of the "excessive entan­
glement" prong of Lemon. 24 7 In the first instance, the Court 
found that the "administrative cooperation" required to im­
plement the program "entangles church and state in still an-
237. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404-06 (1985). 
238. Id. at 406. 
239. Id. at 409. 
240. Id. at 407. 
241 .  Ball, 473 U.S. at 397. 
242. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
243. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409. 
247. See id. at 413-14. 
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other way that infringes interests at the heart of the Estab­
lishment Clause."248 Second, the Court argued that the "nu­
merous judgments that must be made by agents of the city 
[concerning] matters that may be subtle and controversial 
[and] . . .  of deep religious significance" would foster "political 
divisiveness along religious lines."249 
Combined, these decisions meant that in order to provide 
remedial and enrichment programs to students in religious 
schools, the state could no longer use the less expensive and 
less complicated method of moving a few teachers to sectarian 
schools. Instead, the state had to undertake the expense, and 
additional administrative headache, of bussing a much larger 
number of religious school students to public schools. 250 
Once again, what Justice Rehnquist called the "'Catch-22' 
paradox" of the "primary effects/excessive entanglement" 
prongs of Lemon reared its ugly head.251 When, as in Ball, the 
state attempted to meet the needs of students by supplying 
teachers to provide remedial or enriched educational experi­
ences, the Court raised the specter of teachers indoctrinating 
students into the faith.252 As a result, the state failed the "pri­
mary effect" test, despite the Court's acknowledgement that 
there was no actual evidence of such indoctrination in the 
many years of the program's existence.253 If, by providing a 
monitoring system as in Agw1ar, the state attempted to 
guarantee no indoctrination occurred, it would fail the "exces­
sive entanglement" test. 
6. Vocational Rehabilitation Funds for Handicapped 
Students Attending Christian Colleges: Witters v. 
Washington 
In Witters v. Washington,254 the Court agreed that the 
Establishment Clause did not prevent the state of Washing­
ton from providing vocational rehabilitation funds that were 
then used by a blind student to pay for theological studies at 
248. Id. at 413. 
249. Id. at 414. 
250. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 213 (1997) (documenting the addi­
tional expense involved in bussing a large number of religious school students to 
public schools). 
251. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420. 
252. Ball, 473 U.S. at 389. 
253. ld. at 388. 
254. 474 U.S. 481 ( 1986). 
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a Christian college. 255 In a rare instance of unity in judgment, 
but not reasoning, all nine Justices agreed that such aid did 
not have the "primary effect" of advancing religion. 256 
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall pointed to several 
key factors that led to the Court's decision. Marshall began 
by noting that any state aid that ended up in the hands of a 
religious institution did so because of the "genuinely inde­
pendent and private" choices of individual recipients. 257 
Moreover, the program provided aid to recipients without re­
gard to the religious-secular standing of the institution that 
ultimately received the funds.25 8 Nor, according to Marshall, 
did the program provide any incentives that encouraged the 
recipients to choose a religious institution.259 Finally, there 
was no evidence to suggest "that any other person has ever 
sought to finance religious education or activity" through the 
program. 260 Given these facts, the Court concluded that the 
program could not reasonably be viewed as state sponsorship 
d t f l . . 261 or en orsemen o re 1g10n. 
Three separate concurring opinions by Justices White, 
Powell (joined by Burger and Rehnquist), and O'Connor all 
appear to agree that the precedent set down in Mueller 
should have guided the decision in this case.262 Powell's con-
255. Id at 483. 
256. Id. at 489. 
257. Id at 487. 
258. Id. at 487-88. 
259. Id. at 488. 
260. U?tters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
261. Id at 488-89. The Court said that all parties agreed that Washington 
State had a "secular purpose" in creating the program. Id at 485. In addition, 
the Court declined to address the "entanglement" issue because there had been 
no decision on this issue by the district court. Id at 486 n.3. The opinion did 
invite the lower courts to take up the "entanglement" issue. Id Therefore, at 
least for the time being, the state did not run afoul of the first and third prongs 
of Lemon. I d. at 486, 489 n.3. 
262. Given the apparent agreement among all five Justices that this case 
should have been decided according to the principle set down in Mueller, it is 
not clear why none of these five wrote the opinion of the Court. In all three con­
curring opinions each Justice carefully articulates his or her agreement with 
the other concurring opinions. Moreover, no concurring author cites any differ­
ences with the other concurring authors, with the exception of Justice White 
who, while not disagreeing with Justice Powell, did express some apparent res­
ervation when he wrote that he agreed with "most" of what Justice Powell wrote 
"with respect to the relevance of Mueller v. Allen." I d. at 490. Perhaps Justice 
White's small measure of qualification explains why these five Justices did not 
form a majority, but even that reasoning is not clear since Justice White did not 
explain why he agreed with only "most" of what Powell wrote. 
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currence, for instance, argues that Mueller explicitly provides 
that state programs which are "neutral in offering [aid] to a 
class defined without reference to religion do not violate the 
second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, because any aid 
to religion results from the private choices of individual bene­
ficiaries."263 Powell argued that under Mueller, the fact that 
the petitioner was the only individual to attempt to use the 
state assistance to pay for tuition at a religious college is ir­
relevant.264 According to Powell, Mueller held that the state 
could pass aid along to religious institutions provided that 
two conditions are met. First, the state must make the aid 
available to everyone in the class regardless of religious af­
filiation.265 Second, any aid that ends up in the hands of reli­
gious institutions must do so as a result of the genuine 
choices of individuals who have not been pressured or influ­
enced by the state.266 
7. Sign Language Interpreter in Religious High School: 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 
The next significant public funding of private sectarian 
educational case, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dis­
trict,267 also involved a disabled petitioner. James Zobrest, 
who was deaf, sued to force a public school district to provide 
him with a sign-language interpreter to accompany him to a 
Catholic high school.266 The school district denied him the in­
terpreter on the grounds that such aid would violate the Es­
tablishment Clause.269 Both the district and appellate courts 
agreed with the school district.270 
The Supreme Court reversed, continuing its recent trend 
of allowing state aid that is allocated in a religiously neutral 
manner to flow through parents to religious schools. The 
Court premised its holding and analysis on Mueller and Wit­
ters, both of which required the benefits of a state program to 
263. Id. at 491 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)); see also id. at 
493 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing the same language from Lemon that Jus­
tice Powell cited in his concurrence). 
264. Id. at 492. 
265. Id. at 491. 
266. Witters, 474 U.S. at 491. 
267. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
268. Id. at 4. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 4-5. 
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be available to all parents within the class regardless of 
whether their children attend public/secular, private/secular, 
or private/sectarian schools.2 7 1  This requirement emphasized 
the neutrality issue, in that it forced the state to show no 
preference for religion. The Mueller Court also required that 
whatever aid found its way to religious schools had to do so as 
a result of "private decisions of individual parents," without 
any incentive to choose sectarian education. 2 72 
The school district claimed that the Court should distin­
guish Zobrest from Mueller and Wl"tters because the aid re­
quested would require a "public employee [to be] physically 
present in a sectarian school."2 73 The school district argued 
that the facts of Zobrest more closely resembled those of Meek 
and Ball.274 The Court said this argument failed for two rea­
sons. 2 75 In the first instance, the type of programs in Meek 
(teaching material and equipment) and Ball (teachers, in­
structional material, and equipment) "relieved sectarian 
schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating 
their students.'m6 In contrast, the school district in Zobrest 
was not "relieved of an expense that it otherwise would have 
assumed in educating its students. ''2 7 7  
According to the Court, the second distinction was that 
the sign language interpreter, unlike the teachers or equip­
ment in Meek and Ball, "will neither add to nor subtract 
from" the educational process. 2 7 8 In making this point, the 
Court stated that "the Establishment Clause lays down no 
absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian 
school.''2 79 The Court argued that "[s]uch a flat rule, smacking 
of antiquated notions of 'taint,' would indeed exalt form over 
substance."2 8° For the first time, the Court appeared willing 
to accept that religion was not a disease that public employ­
ees automatically caught by virtue of walking into sectarian 
schools. 
271. Id at 8-9. 
272. Id. at 10. 
273. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 11. 
274. /d. 
275. Id at 12. 
276. Id 
277. Id 
278. Id. at 13. 
279. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13. 
280. Jd 
2004 SCHOOL VOUCHERS 737 
Unfortunately, the Court did not spell out the signifi­
cance of the second distinction. The Court appeared to as­
sume that if interpreters faithfully interpret exactly what the 
religious schoolteacher says in class, and do not add anything 
to what is already present in the classroom, they could not be 
said to actively contribute to the indoctrination of religious 
beliefs .2 81 Three members of the dissent clearly believed in 
this interpretation of the majority opinion.282 The dissenters 
argued that the Establishment Clause absolutely prohibits 
government involvement in "indoctrination" of religious be­
liefs.283 This prohibition included interpreters provided at 
state expense in religious schools, because the Establishment 
Clause "always proscribed the provision of benefits that af­
ford even the 'opportunity for the transmission of sectarian 
views."'284 
8. Public School Teachers Revisited: Agostini v. Felton 
In Agostini v. Felton,285 the petitioners, the New York 
City School Board, sought relief from the remedy imposed by 
the Court's earlier decision in Aguilar.286 The underlying pro­
gram and legal issues were the same in both cases. New York 
City wished to use federal Title I funds to provide "remedial 
education, guidance, and job counseling" to students in low 
income areas who were at risk of failing to perform up to 
state standards.2 8 7  Agu1Jar had declared unconstitutional 
New York's attempt to provide such services by placing public 
school teachers in religious schools.28 8  In Agostini, the New 
York City School Board asked the Court to allow it to resume 
this practice.289 
According to the school board, cost considerations moti-
281. See id. 
282. Justice O'Connor, the fourth member of the dissent, did not join the oth­
ers on this point. 
283. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 21.  
284. Id. (citing Wolman v.  Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977)). All four of the 
dissenters would have refused to hear the case on the grounds that rendering a 
decision on the constitutionality of the school district's actions was not unavoid­
able. See id. at 14-17. 
285. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
286. Id. at 208-09. 
287. Id. at 209. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 208. 
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vated its request for relief.290 The Court noted that there had 
been no dispute that Aguilar had imposed "significant" addi­
tional cost. 291 The Court cited evidence that as a result of 
Aguilar the school board had incurred an additional $100 mil­
lion cost to supply the same services.292 The additional ex­
penses were attributed to "computer-aided instruction, leas­
ing sites and mobile instructional units, and transporting 
students to those sites.'m3 Moreover, the federal regulations 
specified that the additional costs imposed by Aguilar were to 
be deducted from Title I funds, and that any other state or 
federal funds could not cover them. 294 The cost of complying 
with Agw1ar meant a dollar for dollar reduction in services 
offered to economically underprivileged at-risk students un­
der Title I.  
The issue turned on whether subsequent decisions had 
rendered Aguilar, and its companion case Ball, "no longer 
good law."295 The Court reiterated the three assumptions jus­
tifying its conclusion in Ball, which held that placing public 
employees in religious schools had the "impermissible effect of 
advancing religion."296 First, when public employees provide 
services on the grounds of religious schools, they aid in the 
inculcation of religion. 29 7 Second, when public employees 
work in sectarian schools, a symbolic union is created be­
tween church and state. 298 Third, "any and all public aid that 
directly aids the educational function of religious schools 
impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even if the 
aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private deci-. ki ,299 swnma ng. 
290. Jd. at 213-14. 
291. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 213. 
292. Jd. 
293. Jd. 
294. Id 
295. Jd. at 209. 
296. Jd. at 222. 
297. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222. 
298. Jd. 
299. I d. The Court's summation of these three assumptions differs from the 
court's summation of issues in Ball, principally with respect to the third as­
sumption related to decision making. In Ball, the Court stated that the third 
reason for finding the program promoted religion was that "the programs in ef­
fect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a 
substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects." Grand 
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985). The resulting difference was critical, 
according to the dissent. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 247 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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The Court then addressed each of these assumptions in 
light of the petitioner's claims that more recent decisions had 
undermined Ball and Aguilar.300 In response to the first as­
sumption, the Court, citing Zobrest, argued that it had 
"abandoned the presumption erected in . . . Ball that the 
placement of public employees on parochial school grounds 
inevitably result[ed] in the impermissible effect of state­
sponsored indoctrination or constitutes symbolic union be­
tween government and religion."301 
The dissent argued that Zobrest could not be cited as 
authority for such a conclusion.302 In the dissent's view, Zo­
brest was limited to those few situations where the public 
employee role was so "circumscribed" that the individual 
could not possibly add any religious content to the class­
room.303 The sign language interpreter in Zobrest had been 
nothing more than a "hearing aid," according to the dissent, 
and thereby incapable of aiding in the indoctrination of relig-
• 304 lOll. 
In response, the majority argued that Zobrest had not re­
lied upon the assumption that a sign language interpreter 
had no opportunity to inject religious content. 305 Had the Zo­
brest Court made such an assumption, it would not have 
bothered to examine the record for evidence that the signer 
had violated his or her professional duty by adding such reli­
gious content.306 
In fairness to the dissent, it must be noted that the Zo­
brest majority did go out of its way to argue that a profes­
sional oath forbidding interpreters from adding or subtracting 
from the message that he or she relayed constrained the 
signer.30 7 The Court might instead have acknowledged that it 
When, as in Ball or Agostini, the publicly supported programs relieved the paro· 
chial schools of a substantial portion of their educational burden, they result in 
«direct and substantial" aid to religion, which is a violation of the Establishment 
Clause. ld. at 252. 
300. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222. 
301 .  ld. at 223. 
302. ld. at 248 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
303. Id at 248-49 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
304. ld. 
305. ld. at 224-25. 
306. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225. 
307. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued that "the task of a sign­
language interpreter seems to us quite different from that of a teacher or a 
guidance counselor . . . .  The sign-language interpreter they have requested will 
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was expanding upon the principle established in Zobrest. 308 
Either way, a majority of the Court had apparently been wait­
ing for an opportunity to overrule the decisions in Aguilar and 
Ball.3o9 
The Court likewise rejected Ball's second assumption 
that the presence of public employees on religious school 
grounds creates an impression of "symbolic union" between 
church and state.310 The majority noted that many lower 
court decisions upheld the provision of Title I services in mo­
bile units located just off religious school grounds.311 Accord­
ing to the Court, these decisions implicitly suggested that the 
symbolic union disappears once the teacher walks from the 
classroom to the mobile unit parked outside.312 This majority 
went on to point out that such analysis reduces the constitu­
tional question to one of mere location, the "degree of coopera­
tion between Title I instructors and parochial school faculty is 
the same no matter where the services are provided."313 Rest­
ing the finding of "symbolic union" on location alone was "nei-
neither add to nor subtract from that environment, and hence the provision of 
such assistance is not barred by the Establishment Clause." Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993). 
308. Such an approach would have presented procedural problems for the 
majority inasmuch as Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursu­
ant to which the appeal in Agostini had been made, did not allow the Court to 
relitigate the claims underlying the original judgment in Aguilar. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) does, however, allow a court to relieve a party 
from the conditions of a previous judgment when "it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have a prospective application." Jd In order to grant "eq­
uitable" relief under Rule 60(b), the majority was forced to argue that the origi­
nal judgment in Aguilar had already been so undermined as to make the con­
tinued enforcement of the judgment inequitable. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 217-18. 
That argument required the majority to argue that Zobrest had already ac­
knowledged that an interpreter could inject content into the interpretation, 
something the Court had not actually done in Zobrest. Jd. at 225. The majority 
obviously recognized the problem it confronted with Rule 60(b), but nonetheless 
concluded that a great inequity would result if it required the school board to 
continue incurring the millions in additional cost required by Aguilar while it 
waited for the Court to get around to doing in a latter case what it was clearly 
prepared to do immediately. Id at 240. 
309. Five Justices had expressed the view that Aguilar should be reconsid­
ered as early as 1994 in Bd. of Ed of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 
512 u.s. 687 (1994). 
310. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 227. 
311 .  Jd. 
312. Id. 
313. Jd 
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ther 'sensible' nor 'sound."'314 
As to the third assumption, the Court claimed that its 
decisions in WJ"tters and Zobrest had undermined the holding 
in B a ll that all aid which supports religion violates the second 
prong of Lemon, the "primary effect" test.315 Witters, for in­
stance, allowed the state to provide a vocational tuition grant 
to a blind student with full knowledge that the student would 
use the money to attend a Christian college.316 The key fact in 
WJ"tters and Zobrest had been that the state had distributed 
the funds in a manner that was neutral with respect to relig­
ion. In both cases, the state had not taken notice, one way or 
the other, of whether the institution that ultimately received 
the funds was sectarian or nonsectarian. This scenario was 
no different than the state issuing a paycheck to a state em­
ployee knowing that the individual intended to contribute 
some of the proceeds to a church.317 According to the Court, 
this same neutrality applied in Agostini because the state 
dispensed Title I aid to students without regard to the reli­
gious nature of the school they chose to attend. 318  
The dissent argued that the manner in which the state 
distributed the aid in Agostini vitiated its neutrality because 
it was paid "directly to the religious school[] ."319 Moreover, 
the dissent implied that because the state distributed Title I 
funds without requiring individual students to apply, these 
distributions did not result from private decision-making of 
individual parents, as had been the case in Zobrest and Wit­
ters.320 
The majority rejected these contentions on several 
grounds. In the first instance the majority pointed out that, 
contrary to the dissent's claim, none of the funds were paid 
"directly to the religious schools."321 Instead federal Title I 
funds passed through the hands of the school board and went 
directly to public agencies who provided services to stu­
dents.322 For that reason none of the funds ever reached the 
314. Jd. at 227-28. 
315. Id. at 225. 
316. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225. 
317. I d. at 226. 
318. Id. at 229. 
319. Id. at 252. 
320 . Jd. 
321. Jd. at 228. 
322. Agostim; 521 U.S. at 228. 
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"coffers of the religious schools" directly or indirectly.323 The 
majority also rejected the claim that providing Title I services 
directly to students, without requiring them to first fill out an 
application, increased the state's financing of religious indoc­
trination. 324 The majority noted that the level of financial 
support for religious indoctrination neither increased nor de­
creased depending upon whether a student fills out an appli­
cation prior to receiving the Title I services.325 
The majority opinion carne close to suggesting that, in 
those situations where no public funds ended up in the hands 
of the religious schools, there is no need to demonstrate that 
aid was given to the student as a "result of the private deci­
sion of individual parents."326 Perhaps the need for parents to 
act as a prophylactic between church and state diminishes 
when the aid is given directly to the student and never turned 
over to the religious school, as such aid does not have the "pri­
mary effect" of advancing religion. 
The majority might have reached a contrary conclusion if 
it accepted the dissent's argument that the Title I aid "subsi­
dized the religious functions of the parochial schools by tak­
ing over a significant portion of their responsibility for teach­
ing secular subjects."32 7 The majority rejected this claim for 
several reasons. Title I regulations forbade sectarian schools 
to reduce the services they normally provided and replace 
them with publicly funded services.328 Nor was there any evi­
dence in the trial record of the sectarian schools violating this 
l t. 329 regu a 10n. 
Moreover, according to the majority, the alternative pro­
posed by the dissent did not provide any greater assurances 
that the sectarian schools would not be equally relieved of 
their responsibilities.330 Under the dissent's solution the same 
Title I services would be offered to students in mobile units 
parked at the curb in front of the religious school.331 The dis-
323. Id. 
324. Id. at 229. 
325. Id. at 229. 
326. Id. at 226 (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 
10 (1993)). 
327. Id. at 250 (citing Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 371, 396-97 (1985)). 
328. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 230. 
331. Id. at 227-28. 
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sent failed to "explain why a sectarian school would not have 
the same incentive to 'make patently significant cutbacks' in 
its curriculum no matter where Title I services are offered, 
since the school would ostensibly be excused from having to 
provide the Title 1-type services itself."332 
The dissent offered no rebuttal to this argument other 
than the unsupported assertion that "off-premises teaching is 
arguably less likely to open the door to relieving religious 
schools of their responsibilities for secular subjects."333 The 
dissent did not explain why a religious school would cut back 
its responsibilities for teaching such subjects when a public 
school teacher is in one of its classrooms, but not in response 
to the same teacher providing the same services in a mobile 
van parked sixty feet away. 
Although Justice Souter thought that the majority's ar­
gument on this point "might prove too much," he shied away 
(perhaps for good reason) from explaining this remark. 334 He 
may have meant to suggest that the majority had demon­
strated that providing Title I type aid to students anywhere 
would relieve sectarian schools of substantial secular educa­
tional burdens. If so, he would be driven to conclude that 
once students chose to attend a sectarian school, the state 
must shun them by denying them any kind of educational 
support anywhere. Presumably the constitutional implica­
tions of this position were untenable even for most of the dis­
senting members in this decision. The Court has long main­
tained that the Constitution does not require the state "to be 
hostile to religion."335 It is difficult to imagine how a Court 
decision that forced states to refuse any remedial help to stu­
dents anywhere-simply because they chose to attend sectar­
ian schools-might be interpreted as anything but hostility 
toward religion. 
In addition to finding that the Title I program had the 
impermissible "effect of advancing religion," the Aguilar 
Court had also found that the program resulted in excessive 
entanglement between church and state.336 The Agostini 
Court also addressed that issue. The Court said that in the 
332. Id. at 230 (quoting Souter, J., dissenting). 
333. Id. at 247. 
334. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 246. 
335. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 ( 1952). 
336. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985). 
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past, the issue of excessive entanglement had been considered 
as both part of the "effect" test and "as a factor separate and 
apart from 'effect."'33 7 The Court then proposed ceasing to 
treat the analysis of "excessive entanglement" as an issue 
separate from the "effect" inquiry on the grounds that the in­
quiry was "similar" in either instance. 338 In both cases, the 
Court looked at the "character and purpose of the institutions 
benefited" and the "nature of the aid that the State pro­
vides."339 The second and third prongs of Lemon thus became 
a single inquiry. 
The Court argued that the finding of "excessive entan­
glement" in Aguilar rested upon three assumptions: "(i) the 
program would require 'pervasive monitoring by public au­
thorities' to ensure that Title I employees did not inculcate re­
ligion; (ii) the program required 'administrative cooperation' 
between the Board and parochial schools; and (iii) the pro­
gram might increase the dangers of 'political divisiveness."'340 
The Court argued that under its current interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause, the last two considerations standing 
alone were insufficient to cause the "excessive entangle­
ment."341 The Court pointed out that no court had held that 
the state could not offer the services provided under Title I off 
campus. 342 Regardless of where the state offered the services, 
the same level of "administrative cooperation" and the same 
incentives for "political divisiveness" were present.343 Since 
even the dissent was willing to brook the same level of "ad­
ministrative cooperation" and "political divisiveness" when 
assistance was offered off campus, the Court saw those fac­
tors as insufficient to find a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.344 
As to the issue of "pervasive monitoring," the Court also 
found no grounds for an Establishment Clause violation. 345 
The Aguilar Court had assumed that public school teachers 
could not be trusted to avoid inculcating religious values 
337. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232. 
338. ld. at 232, 233. 
339. Id at 232. 
340. ld. at 233 (quoting Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-14). 
341. Id. at 233-34. 
342. I d. at 234. 
343. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-34. 
344. ld 
345. ld. at 233. 
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while on parochial schools grounds.346 As a result, the Court 
further assumed that the state would require "pervasive 
monitoring."347 The Zobrest Court, however, had rejected the 
assumption that teachers would violate the restrictions on in­
culcating religion.348 If the Court did not assume that teach­
ers would violate the prohibition against inculcating religion, 
then it need not assume that the state would require "perva­
sive monitoring." The Court was satisfied that the (unan­
nounced) monthly visits by public school officials, which it did 
not regard as "pervasive monitoring," would provide adequate 
protection against violations by public school teachers. 349 
Thus, the Court appears to have resolved the "catch-22" di­
lemma established in Lemon, at least for now. 
Ill. IMPETUS FOR SCHOOL VOUCHERS 
There is widespread concern that America's public 
schools, particularly those that service poor inner city areas, 
are not doing an adequate job of educating children.350 A vari­
ety of evidence suggests that American children's test results 
are dropping both over time and in comparison to interna-
346. Id. at 234. 
347. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412-13. 
348. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234. 
349. Id. 
350. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE ( 1995); John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, E!Iec­
tive Schools and Equal Opportunity, in PuBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
(Neal E. Devins ed., 1989); PETER W. COOKSON JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN EDUCATION ( 1994). Cf. Raymond Do­
manico, Catholic Schools in New York City (2001), at 
http://www.heartland.org/PolicyBotTopic.cfm?artTopic=424 (unpublished report 
prepared for New York University, Program on Education and Civil Society). 
This report compares the academic performance of New York City's Catholic 
elementary schools to the city's public schools, and finds that 
!d. 
Data analysis indicates that private schools in New York City are 
bringing their students to higher levels of achievement than are public 
schools, regardless of the number of poor and minority students. The 
higher achievement of Catholic schools is much more pronounced in 
grade 8 than in grade 4. In English language arts, there is a 17-point 
difference between Catholic school and public school eighth graders 
and a 20-point difference in mathematics. Catholic schools come closer 
to breaking the link between race, family income, and student 
achievement than do public schools. Catholic schools are more success­
ful at maintaining a basic level of achievement than are public schools. 
The performance of poor and minority students in Catholic schools 
demonstrates the educability of the city's youngsters. 
746 SANTA CLARA LA W  REVIEW 
t . 1 351 10na averages. 
Vol: 44 
One of the more intriguing proposals for responding to 
this educational crisis is the concept of school vouchers. Al­
though specific proposals vary in their details, the general 
concept involves providing parents with a check that they can 
use to purchase private school education for their children. 352 
The idea is that parents, operating under free market princi­
ples, will seek out the best possible education for their chil­
dren thus maximizing individual good. In addition, the com­
petition that results from these individual decisions will force 
all schools to improve the quality of their educational pro­
grams in order to compete, consequently maximizing public 
good. 
The impetus for the idea's growing popularity, however, 
extends beyond free market theory.353 The real force behind 
this movement probably lies in the growing body of literature 
suggesting that private schools, particularly religious based 
private schools, do a better job of educating children in urban 
areas than do public schools.354 Of course, not all researchers 
agree about the positive impact of either vouchers or religious 
351. See Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational Opportunity: School 
RefOrm, Law and Public Policy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 1 13, 1 1 15 (2001) (reviewing 
JAY P. HEUBERT, LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING 
EDUCATION EQUITY (1999) and SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: 
POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAw (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 
1999)) (noting that National Assessment of Educational Progress test results 
indicate that science proficiency declined significantly for seventeen-year-olds 
from 1969 to 1990, with some improvement during the 1980s but not enough to 
meet 1970s levels, and citing the Third International Mathematics and Science 
Study, which demonstrates that American students fall further and further be­
hind their international counterparts as they progress through the American 
educational system). 
352. See Allison M. Olczak, Note, Scaling the Wall Between Church and 
State, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of School Vouchers, 89 KY. L.J. 507 
(2000/2001) (providing a brief summary of the conceptual history of school 
vouchers as developed by John Stuart Mill and Milton Friedman). 
353. Milton Friedman, an economics professor at the University of Chicago, 
launched the modern debate over school vouchers with the publication of 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM in 1962. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
354. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, 
AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF 
EDUCATION (1966); JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PuBLIC AND 
PRIVATE HIGH SCHOOLS: THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITIES (1987); Raymond Do­
manico, Catholic Schools in New York City (2001) (unpublished manuscript 
prepared for New York University, Program on Education and Civil Society). 
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based education.355 
Nonetheless, many parents of children in failing public 
schools appear willing to take a chance on private religious 
schools, if only because they have given up on the public 
school system.356 Unlike scholars,357 parents do not care why 
religious based private schools appear to outperform public 
schools; they simply want their children to receive a quality 
education. Absent a drastic improvement in the performance 
of inner city public schools, or a significant dip in the per­
formance of private religious schools, the pressure for more 
widespread use of vouchers is likely to continue.35 8 Parents of 
children dramatically shortchanged by public schools will be 
held at bay by constitutional arguments about separation of 
church and state for only so long. Justice Stevens, for in­
stance, writes in the opening remarks of his dissent in Zel-
355. See generally KARL L. ALEXANDER & AARON M. PALLAS, PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC POLICY: NEW EVIDENCE ON COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS IN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS ( 1983); see also Marla E. Sukstorf et al., A Re­
examination of Chubb and Moe's Politics Markets and America 's Schools, in 
SCHOOL CHOICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 209 (Edith & Richard Rothstein 
eds., 1993). 
356. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 682 n.7 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). Justice Thomas noted 
Minority and low-income parents express the greatest support for pa­
rental choice and are most interested in placing their children in pri­
vate schools. "The appeal of private schools is especially strong among 
parents who are low in income, minority, and live in low-performing 
districts: precisely the parents who are the most disadvantaged under 
the current system." Nearly three-fourths of all public school parents 
with annual income less than $20,000 support vouchers, compared to 
57 percent of public school parents with an annual income of over 
$60,000. In addition, 75 percent of black public school parents support 
vouchers, as do 71 percent of Hispanic public school parents. 
ld (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND 
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 164 (2001)); see also Frank Newport & Joseph Carroll, 
No Public Consensus Yet on School Voucher Programs, GALLOP NEWS SERVICE 
POLL ANALYSES (Jan. 15, 2001) (presenting a more comprehensive set of data 
regarding public opinion and school vouchers). 
357. See generally Stephen L. Morgan, Counterfactuals, Causal Effect Het­
erogeneity, and the Catholic School Effect on Learning, 74 Soc. OF EDUC. 341 
(2001) (arguing that it is insufficient to offer only descriptive modeling justifica­
tions for the impact of Catholic schools without offering what is causing the im­
pact). 
358. Polling data suggest that the school vouchers concept is gaining accep­
tance in the public's mind. Gallup data, for instance, indicates a general in­
crease in support over the last decade. See The 30th Annual Phi Delta 
Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, available 
at http://www.gallup.com/contentl?ci=2122. 
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man: 
I think that we should ignore three factual matters that 
are discussed at length by my colleagues. First, the severe 
educational crisis that confronted the Cleveland City 
School District when Ohio enacted its voucher program is 
not a matter that should affect our appraisal of its consti­
tutionality . . . .  Of course, the emergency may have given 
some families a powerful motivation to leave the public 
school system and accept religious indoctrination that 
they would otherwise have avoided, but that is not a valid 
reason for upholding the program. 359 
Such remarks undoubtedly seem callous to parents with 
children whose future prospects are rapidly diminishing. In 
the end, the living, breathing Constitution will have to ac­
commodate the changing needs of the American educational 
system or face the wrath of poor, angry parents who want 
equal educational opportunities for their children. 
As the case review in Part II suggest, at the same time 
that policy considerations moved public opinion toward accep­
tance of school vouchers, the Supreme Court was slowly lay­
ing the legal groundwork for constitutional accommodation. 
IV. SCHOOL VOUCHERS: ZELMAN V. HARRIS 
In Zelman v. Harris,360 the Court was asked to determine 
whether the state of Ohio could continue to run a program 
that allowed parents to pay tuition costs at religious schools 
in part with public funds. The program consisted of two 
kinds of aid: tuition scholarships, in the form of vouchers for 
students who chose private schools within the district or pub­
lic schools outside their district, and tutorial aid for students 
who remained in public schools. 3 61 
Ohio devised the voucher plan partly in response to the 
fact that "for more than a generation . . .  Cleveland's public 
schools have been among the worst performing public schools 
in the N ation."3 62 The schools performed so poorly that a fed-
359. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684. Justice Stevens offered no evidence to support 
his conclusion that parents were being forced to accept "religious indoctrination" 
against their wishes if they wanted to send their children to private schools. Jd 
360. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
361. Id at 645. The respondents did not question the constitutionality of the 
tutorial program. 
362. Id at 644. 
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eral district court relieved the local school board of its author­
ity and placed the entire city school system under state con­
trol.363 According to a state audit, the Cleveland school dis­
trict "failed to meet any of the 18 state standards for minimal 
acceptable performance" and "[o]nly 1 in 10 ninth graders 
could pass a basic proficiency examination."364 More than 
two-thirds of the city's students failed or dropped out prior to 
graduation. 365 
The scholarship portion of the program allowed parents 
to use the voucher at any public or private school, including 
religious schools that met statewide educational standards.366 
Public schools were eligible to receive the $2250 per-student 
tuition scholarship voucher, plus the standard amount of 
state aid the school normally received for each additional stu­
dent it enrolled.367 Payment to nonpublic schools varied ac­
cording to the financial needs of individual students and their 
families.36 8  The plan provided that "[f]amilies with incomes 
below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eli­
gible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250."369 
The program restricted participating private schools to a co­
payment no greater than $250 for the lowest income fami­
lies.370 All families not meeting the lowest income require­
ments were eligible for tuition grants of up to $ 1875 with no 
co-payment restrictions.371 But "[t]hese families receive tui­
tion aid only if the number of available scholarships exceeds 
the number of low-income children who choose to partici­
pate."372 
Fifty-six private schools participated in the program, the 
majority of which were religious institutions.373 None of the 
area's public schools adjacent to the city agreed to participate 
in the program.374 Over 3700 students took part in the schol-
363. Id. 
364. Id. 
365. Id. 
366. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645. 
367. Id. 
368. Id. at 646. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. 
371.  Id. 
372. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646. 
373. Specifically, eighty-two percent, or forty-six schools in the program were 
religious. Id. at 647. 
374. Id. at 647. 
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arship program, of which ninety-six percent enrolled in reli­
gious schools.375 Sixty percent of the participating students 
were members of families defined as impoverished. 376 
In response to the poor performance of the regular public 
schools, Cleveland also developed, separate and apart from 
the voucher program, public community and magnet 
schools. 377 The ten public community schools operating in the 
Cleveland district in 1999-2000 enrolled over 1900 students.37 8 
These schools, which were forbidden to have any religious af­
filiation, received twice the state funding as participating re­
ligious schools received in the program.379 Independent public 
school boards ran the community schools.380 In the same year, 
the twenty-three magnet schools enrolled more than 13,000 
students for which they received $7746 in aid per student (the 
same amount as the students enrolled in traditional public 
schools). 3 81 
Applying the Lemon test as revised by Agostini, the 
Court found that the program had the valid secular purpose 
of assisting a "failing public schools system."382 The only re­
maining question for the Court was whether the program had 
the unconstitutional "effect" of advancing religion.383 The ma­
jority found the program passed the "effect" test because it 
dispensed benefits on a religiously neutral basis and because 
any state aid that ended up in the hands of religious schools 
did so only as a result of the genuine and independent choices 
of private individuals.384 From the perspective of the majority, 
those choices included remaining in traditional schools with 
or without "tutoring," enrolling in community and magnet 
schools, or attending private secular or religious schools. 385 
Led by Justice Souter, the dissenters found neither neu­
trality nor choice in the Cleveland program. Regarding neu­
trality, Justice Souter made two claims. First, he argued that 
375. Jd 
376. Jd. 
377. Jd 
378. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647. 
379. Jd 
380. Jd. 
38 1. Id. at 647-48. 
382. Id at 649. 
383. Jd. at 649. 
384. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662. 
385. Jd at 655. 
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since parents could not spend the vouchers at public schools 
within the district, those schools should not be considered one 
of the options available to students when determining if the 
program was neutral.386 He argued that the only schools that 
the Court could consider in the neutrality debate were those 
that were a viable option for voucher recipients.3 8 7  Having 
taken the public schools out of the neutrality analysis,  he 
then argued that the amount of the voucher, $2250, was in­
sufficient to pay tuition at most of the city's secular private 
schools.388 According to Justice Souter, the voucher's insuffi­
cient funding level forced parents to choose religious schools 
whose tuition was considerably lower.389 As a result, the pro­
gram was not neutral in its treatment of religion because it 
forced parents to choose religious schools for their children.390 
Second, he compared the amount that the program's "tu­
toring'' option made available to students who chose to stay in 
public schools ($324 annually) to the amount that the pro­
gram made available to students who chose the voucher op­
tion ($2400 annually), and concluded that the significant dis­
parity implied bias in favor of religion.391 Once again, the 
program was not neutral in Justice Souter's view, because it 
made more funds available for religious than for public 
schools.392 
For much the same reason, the dissent also maintained 
that the program failed to provide true choice to aid recipi­
ents.393 Justice Souter argued that the majority "confused 
choice in spending scholarships with choice from the entire 
menu of possible educational placements."394 From the dis­
sent's perspective, the list of "choices" was limited to those 
schools that actually could accept the voucher as payment. 395 
The dissent rejected the notion that public schools should be 
considered in the choice question because once individuals 
chose the voucher program, they could no longer opt to spend 
386. Id. at 697 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
387. I d. at 697, 704-05. 
388. Id. at 704-05. 
389. Id. at 706-07. 
390. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 705-07. 
391. Id. at 697-98. 
392. Id. at 697-98. 
393. Id. at 698-99. 
394. Id. 
395. See id. 
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the money at those public schools within the district. 39 6 Once 
again, as in the neutrality analysis, Justice Souter argued 
that the amount of the voucher, $2250, was insufficient to pay 
tuition at most of Cleveland's secular private schools.39 7 In 
the smaller pool of choices available to voucher recipients, 
eighty-two percent of the participating schools turned out to 
be religious schools. 398 Therefore, the program did not satisfy 
the choice requirement because parents did not have a sig­
nificant number of nonreligious schools from which to 
choose.399 
The dissent found further evidence of the lack of choice in 
the fact that ninety-six percent of the students who partici­
pated in the voucher program chose to attend religious 
schools.400 According to Justice Souter, this lack of choice re­
sulted because there were too few slots available in private 
secular schools for voucher holders, and because the amount 
of the voucher was insufficient to cover tuition costs at pri­
vate secular schools.401 Nor could this overwhelming selection 
of religious schools be a reflection of parents' religious choices, 
since two-thirds of the children attended schools not of their 
faith.402 
Not surprisingly, the majority saw the case quite differ­
ently. Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by arguing that 
the Court's decisions had drawn a "consistent distinction" be­
tween state sponsored programs that gave aid directly to reli­
gious schools and neutral programs of "true private choice," 
where state aid reached religious schools "only as a result of 
the genuine and independent choices of private individu-
1 ,403 a s. 
According to Justice Rehnquist, the determining issue in 
the neutrality analysis was whether "the program differenti­
ates based on the religious status of beneficiaries or providers 
396. As noted earlier, none of the public schools in the adjacent districts that 
could have received the funds chose to participate in the program. See Zelman, 
536 U.S. at 647. 
397. Id at 706-07. 
398. Id at 647. 
399. Id. at 707. 
400. Id 
401.  Id. 
402. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704. 
403. Id. at 649 (citing Muller, Witters, and Zobrest). 
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of services."404 Receipt of benefits was not conditional on any 
sort of religious commitment, or lack thereof, by parents, 
children, or schools.405 The program allowed parents to spend 
the aid at any private school within the district, or any public 
school in an adjacent district, regardless of religious or nonre­
ligious affiliation.406 According to the majority, the program 
gave public schools located outside the district a special fi­
nancial incentive to participate that was not provided to reli­
gious schools.407 The Court found additional evidence of neu­
trality in the impetus for the program: the state designed the 
program to provide assistance to children in a failing school 
system.406 Any benefit to religion was incidental to the state's 
goal of aiding children, rather than a result of the state's 
preference for religion.409 Justice Rehnquist noted that the 
only preference in the program was for students from low­
income families.410 
Further, the Court found proof of the program's neutral­
ity in the fact that there were no '"financial incentives' that 
'skew[ed]' the program toward religious schools."411 On the 
contrary, the state built disincentives into the program for 
parents wishing to choose religious schools and for religious 
schools themselves. Parents who chose private religious (or 
private nonreligious) schools had to pay tuition co-payments 
that parents choosing public community or magnet schools 
did not have to pay.412 Private schools received state assis­
tance one-half to two-thirds less than community or magnet 
schools, respectively.413 Again, participating public schools in 
adjacent school districts were eligible to receive two or three 
times the government assistance that private religious 
schools could receive under the program.414 To the extent that 
the program was skewed at all, argued the majority, it 
404. Id. at 654 n.3. 
405. Id. at 653. 
406. Id. 
407. Id. 
408. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655. 
409. Id. 
410. Id. at 653. 
411.  Id. (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 
487-88 ( 1986)). 
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413. Id. at 654. 
414. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 654. 
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pushed parents toward public schools.415 
In addition, the majority argued that Justice Souter mis­
calculated the total amount of aid available to students who 
chose the "tutoring'' program.416 Students who chose the "tu­
tor" option caused the state to provide its public schools with 
$4167 in regular aid plus the $324 in tutorial assistance.417 
This amount far exceeded the $2250 maximum amount pri­
vate religious schools could receive under the program. From 
the majority's perspective, the program was neutral because 
it did not provide financial incentives that steered individuals 
toward religious schools.418 
Moving on to the issue of "choice," the majority argued 
that "[t]here also is no evidence that the program fails to pro­
vide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select 
secular educational options."419 The majority argued that 
Cleveland's schoolchildren had a wide range of educational 
options that included staying in public school, with or without 
"tutoring," attending a community or magnet school, or en­
rolling in a private secular or sectarian school.420 According to 
the maj ority, the key to assessing the constitutionality of the 
Cleveland program was to ask whether Ohio was forcing chil­
dren to attend religious schools.421 In order to answer that 
question properly, the majority believed that it had to con­
sider all of the educational options available to Cleveland's 
schoolchildren, including public schools that were not part of 
the program. 422 
That eighty-two percent of the private schools were reli­
gious was not grounds for declaring the program unconstitu­
tional, according to the majority.423 Because eighty-one per­
cent of Cleveland's private schools had been religious schools 
before the program was created,424 the program did not cause 
this disparity. Indeed, the relative percentage of secular to 
sectarian schools that participated in the program reflected a 
415. Id 
416. Jd at 654 n.3. 
417. Jd. 
418. Jd at 654. 
419. Id. at 655. 
420. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655. 
42 1. Id. at 655-56. 
422. Jd. 
423. !d. at 655. 
424. Id. at 657. 
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cross-section of religious-nonreligious private schools.425 The 
majority argued that if this sort of statistical evidence were 
used to declare programs unconstitutional, it would lead to 
uneven and absurd results.426 Two identical programs in two 
different cities might result in two different constitutional 
rulings simply because one city had a higher percentage of 
secular private schools.427 
Justice Rehnquist also noted that although the program 
spurred the creation of "several" new nonreligious schools, it 
had not spurred the creation of any new religious schools.428 
The creation of the new secular private schools occurred de­
spite the litigation before the Court, which had served as a 
"barrier to entry" for such schools because the litigation 
threatened the continued financial commitment from the 
state.429 
The majority likewise rejected Justice Souter's complaint 
that insufficient funding levels forced students, who would 
otherwise have chosen the more expensive private secular 
schools, to attend religious schools.430 The majority pointed 
out that ten private secular schools found the funding levels 
sufficient.431 Justice Rehnquist further noted that "not a scin­
tilla of evidence" had been produced at trial to support the 
claim that any private secular school refused to participate 
because funding levels were too low.432 
For similar reasons, the majority rejected Justice 
Souter's claim that the fact that ninety-six percent of voucher 
425. Id. 
426. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 657. 
427. Id. 
428. Id. at 656 n.4. 
429. Id. 
430. Id. at 656-57. 
431. Id. at 656 n.4. 
432. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 656 n.4 (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 
F.3d 945, 970 (6th Cir. 2000) (Ryan, J., concurring)). Justice Souter appears to 
devise yet another "catch-22" for the state. If the state failed to provide enough 
funding to pay for expensive private secular schools, he claimed that it steered 
students toward religious schools. If the state did provide enough money for 
students to choose expensive private secular schools, then it would inevitably 
also transfer more money to religious schools, which Souter found just as objec­
tionable. He left no doubt that he would find a constitutional objection either 
way when, after complaining that the funding levels were insufficient to pay for 
most secular private schools, he went on to write: "It is not, of course, that I 
think even a genuine choice criteria is up to the task of the Establishment 
Clause when substantial state funds go to religious teaching." I d. at 703. 
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holders chose religious schools was evidence that the program 
did not offer parents real choice.433 Citing Mueller and 
Agostini, Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]he Constitutionality 
of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on 
whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, 
most private schools are run by religious organizations, or 
most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school."434 
He also noted that the ninety-six percent statistic failed to ac­
count for the 1900 students enrolled in community schools, 
the 13,000 children attending magnet schools, or the 1400 
students in traditional schools who chose the "tutoring'' op­
tion.435 When these choices were taken into account, the per­
centage of students who chose religious schools dropped to 
under twenty percent.436 Justice Rehnquist also pointed out 
that the ninety-six percent figure was applicable to one par­
ticular year and that, in the 1997-1998 school year, only sev­
enty-eight percent of voucher holders chose religious 
schools.437 
Justice Souter was not impressed by these figures be­
cause he and the other dissenters believed that the Court 
should not be including options that were not a formal part of 
the program in the calculation.438 For Justice Souter, the 
433. I d. at 658-60. 
434. Id at 658. 
435. Id at 659. 
436. Id. 
437. Id. Justice Rehnquist cited evidence from a similar program in Milwau­
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point of the "choice" test was to provide the Court with a tool 
for weeding out educational aid programs that provided funds 
to religious schools.439 For the majority, the point of the choice 
test was clearly different. The majority saw the choice test as 
a means of upholding the Constitution's guarantee that no 
one would be forced to subscribe to a religious act or view 
against his or her will.440 Under Justice Souter's approach, 
even if individuals were absolutely free from any coercion by 
the state, because they can choose not to participate in the 
program, the program is unconstitutional if too many of those 
that do participate attend religious schools. 
It is not immediately clear why, in determining whether 
a program is neutral or whether choice exists, the Court 
should turn a blind eye to funds provided to public schools, or 
to other educational options that are not funneled through 
the program. Such an approach would make sense only if 
students were forced into the program and could not opt for a 
nonreligious school choice. In that case, the only fund­
ing/choice that individuals would have would be the one that 
accompanied the private religious school that the state forced 
them to attend. But the state is not "directing'' aid to reli­
gious schools if parents have legitimate secular school op­
tions, be they public or private. In Cleveland's case, students 
had the option of not participating in the program at all by 
remaining in their regular schools, attending community or 
magnet schools, participating while remaining in public 
schools with tutors, or participating by selecting private reli­
gious or secular schools.441 In such cases, it is reasonable to 
consider all those choices, and any aid that accompanies all of 
those choices, when considering the neutrality/choice issue. 
One way to understand the majority's position would be 
to imagine that Cleveland adopted an "All Vouchers" educa­
tional system. In such a system, the state would give every 
student a voucher to purchase education, and the state would 
not assign any student to public schools by default. Students 
would then choose on which of the various school choices they 
would spend their money. In such a system, if the state of-
439. Id. at 699. Justice Souter wrote "Defining choice as choice in spending 
the money or channeling the aid is, moreover, necessary if the choice criterion is 
to function as a limiting principle at all." Id. at 700. 
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fered students who chose the public schools two to three times 
as much aid as those who chose the private religious schools, 
with an additional grant of $324 to all students who chose the 
public schools system with tutoring assistance, no one could 
question the program's neutrality. An "All Vouchers" educa­
tional system of this kind would obviously be skewed toward 
public schools. The only difference between an "All Voucher" 
system and the one actually challenged in Zelman were for­
mal legal definitions. Considered from the perspective of stu­
dents or parents, the choices were virtually identical, and the 
legal definitions did not restrict the "choices" available to par­
ents or children. 
Yet another way to understand the majorities' position 
would be to view the educational choices from the perspective 
of a poor family that has just moved into Cleveland. Such a 
family could indeed choose from among all the choices the 
majority claimed were available. Nothing about the state's 
voucher program would encourage the family to choose reli­
gious schools, other than the better education opportunities 
available at private sectarian schools, which the state did 
nothing to help create. From the perspective of such a family, 
Cleveland would offer many genuine educational choices 
without any pressure to choose one over the other. 
This was exactly the position of every poor family in 
Cleveland that participated in the voucher program whether 
or not they had recently moved to the city. The only families 
that were not given this range of choices were those that were 
not poor. Such families were actually pressured by Ohio to 
accept public education because, for them, the state offered 
considerably reduced subsidies. Again, if we are to be per­
suaded by Justice Souter's position that the only choices that 
should be considered were those that were available after the 
family chose the voucher program, we should demand some 
evidence that the parents had no choice but to select the 
voucher program in the first instance. No such evidence ex­
ists. 
Even if the Court considered only the choices available to 
students after they opt for the voucher program, contrary to 
Justice Souter's assertion, it must consider whether the state 
sought to promote religion by discouraging the participation 
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of secular schools.442 The state of Ohio offered a financial in­
centive to adjacent public school districts to encourage them 
to participate in the program.443 That none chose to partici­
pate had nothing to do with the state wishing to force stu­
dents to choose religious schools. On the contrary, all of the 
adjacent public schools that opted not to participate in the 
program likely had a motive for wishing to see the program 
fail. Voucher programs like Cleveland's threaten to break the 
monopoly that public school systems have on education in 
America. Under Justice Souter's analysis, refusal to partici­
pate strengthened the position of those seeking to have the 
program declared unconstitutional.444 Ironically, had Justice 
Souter had his way, the Court would have interpreted behav­
ior by the adjacent public schools that may have been deliber­
ately intended to harm religious schools as promoting relig­
ion. Public school officials wishing to suppress competition 
from private schools should not be able to decide the constitu­
tional fate of a voucher program like Cleveland's. 
Justice Souter also argued that when ninety-six percent 
of the students who participate in such programs chose reli­
gious schools, it served as evidence that parents do not have 
real choices.445 This is particularly likely he argued, when 
two-thirds of such children choose schools that do not reflect 
their religious affiliation.446 According to Justice Souter, the 
real explanation for the overwhelming choice of religious 
schools was the paltry funding levels of the vouchers that 
were insufficient to pay for private secular schools.447 
This argument assumes that most parents were too poor 
to supplement the voucher so that their children could attend 
more expensive private secular schools. But the fact was that 
about forty percent of the students participating in the pro­
gram were from families that were not considered poor.448 
442. See id. at 656 n.4. Justice Souter argued that "it is entirely irrelevant 
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Some portion of those families almost certainly could have af­
forded to supplement the voucher had they wished to have 
their children attend nonreligious schools.  That they none­
theless chose religious schools suggests that the choice had 
little to do with insufficient state funding. 
Equally plausible, and no less supported by the record 
than Justice Souter's assumption, is the possibility that reli­
gious tensions have so abated in America that many parents 
feel free to have their children attend religious schools out­
side their own faith. Whatever the explanation, it is clear 
that the state was not forcing students to attend religious 
schools against their will. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Those who would brook greater interplay between church 
and state must remember that there are legitimate reasons 
for maintaining a reasonable level of division between relig­
ion and government in America. If either institution becomes 
too involved with the affairs of the other it could lead to in­
fringement of individual liberty and that might become the 
bases for social unrest. Current events throughout the world 
warn us of the continuing danger that can result when these 
two powerful forces are intimately united. Conversely, in­
fringement of individual religious liberty and social unrest 
can also result if government is perceived to be the enemy of 
religion. As it seeks to strike a balance between these two 
dangerous extremes, the Court needs to be ever mindful of 
the core purpose of the First Amendment-the need to protect 
every individual's liberty to accept or reject religious beliefs. 
Given the dangers that might result if the state interferes 
with this liberty by appearing to favor or oppose religion, the 
Court ought to avoid devising tests that restrict its flexibility 
in this area. 
Fortunately, the Court seems to be moving away from the 
less flexible three-part test it devised in Lemon in favor of a 
more flexible approach to church and state cases. While 
bright line tests have intrinsic appeal because of the certainty 
they provide, they generally prove too rigid to deal with the 
great variety of cases that are certain to arise in areas like 
the First Amendment. The Court may wish to consider re­
turning to the more malleable approach it used in Zorach. 
There, as noted above, the Court implied that whenever state 
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action threatened the principle of "free exercise" or came close 
to actual "establishment," separation must be "complete and 
unequivocal."449 When, however, state actions infringe upon 
neither of these principles, the Court suggested that it would 
allow greater interplay between these two institutions.450 
This approach has the great benefit of allowing the Court to 
recognize, in cases like Zelman, that the state is neither at­
tempting to interfere with anyone's religious liberty nor es­
tablishing a religion. 
The Court's decision in Zelman is consistent with this 
approach. Any voucher program that does nothing either to 
favor or discourage religion and that offers parents real 
choices such that the state does not force anyone to attend a 
religious school against his or her will ought to be found con­
stitutional. This notion is particularly true as America strug­
gles to find innovative solutions to reverse the failure of inner 
city public schools. Extremely narrow interpretations of the 
Establishment Clause that turn their back on these problems 
will do neither the Constitution nor the American educational 
system justice. 
449. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 3 12 ( 1952). 
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